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Introduction	  Common	  Cents:	  Ledbetter,	  The	  Law,	  and	  Congress	  	  	  	  	  	   Courts	  are	  rarely	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  significant	  social	  change.1	  It	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  create	  policy	  or	  enact	  law;	  they	  are	  bound	  by	  their	  function,	  based	  primarily	  on	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  precedents	  and	  statutes.2	  However,	  in	  rare,	  notable	  cases	  in	  history,	  as	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear3,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  crucial	  social	  legislation.	  The	  arguments	  before	  the	  Court	  in	  this	  case	  became	  important	  elements	  that	  propelled	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  20094	  only	  two	  years	  later.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  first	  bill	  that	  President	  Obama	  signed	  into	  law	  during	  his	  presidency.5	  A	  few	  elements	  of	  Ledbetter	  make	  it	  a	  significant	  case.	  The	  Court	  in	  Ledbetter	  considered	  gender	  equality	  in	  pay	  established	  by	  Congress	  in	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  19646.	  In	  a	  5-­‐4	  decision,	  the	  Court	  found	  for	  the	  employer,	  while	  the	  dissent	  had	  a	  distinctly	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Michael	  J.	  Klarman,	  Social	  Reform	  Litigation	  and	  Its	  Challenges:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Honor	  of	  Justice	  Ruth	  Bader	  Ginsburg,	  32	  HARV.	  J.L.	  &	  GENDER	  (2009)	  2	  Paul	  Horowitz,	  The	  Hobby	  Lobby	  Moment.	  128	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  154	  (2014)	  3	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Co.,	  550	  U.S.	  618	  (2007)	  4	  S.181,	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  111th	  Cong.	  (2009)	  5	  Sheryl	  Gay	  Stolberg,	  Obama	  Signs	  Equal	  Pay	  Legislation,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  29th,	  2009.	  6	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  88-­‐352,	  78	  Stat.	  241	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understanding	  of	  the	  case.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  Ledbetter	  is	  a	  case	  that	  exemplifies	  competing	  approaches	  to	  statutory	  interpretation,	  and	  how	  these	  differing	  philosophies	  shape	  legal	  opinions.	  This	  thesis	  will	  explore	  the	  concrete	  arguments	  made	  by	  both	  the	  majority	  and	  the	  dissent	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  opinions	  spurred	  Congress	  to	  act.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  in	  her	  dissent,	  demonstrated	  her	  wealth	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  gender	  rights	  litigator.	  The	  dissent	  in	  Ledbetter	  is	  unlike	  other	  dissents.	  It	  was	  written	  directly	  to	  Congress,	  demanding	  action	  and	  providing	  the	  exact	  framework	  for	  that	  action.	  The	  arguments	  contained	  in	  the	  dissent	  are	  complicated	  and	  nuanced,	  but	  they	  are	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  how	  Ginsburg	  created	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009.	  
Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  is	  also	  a	  rare	  case	  study	  for	  Congressional	  override	  of	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  opinion,	  illustrating	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  three	  branches	  of	  government	  communicate	  to	  create	  meaningful	  social	  legislation.	  	  	   The	  Ledbetter	  case	  started	  with	  a	  woman	  for	  whom	  the	  EEOC	  brought	  suit	  and	  the	  2009	  Fair	  pay	  Act	  is	  named.	  Lilly	  McDaniel	  was	  born	  in	  a	  house	  with	  no	  running	  water	  or	  electricity	  in	  Possum	  Trot,	  Alabama	  on	  April	  14th,	  1938.7	  After	  graduating	  from	  high	  school,	  she	  married	  Charles	  Ledbetter	  and	  had	  two	  children.	  In	  1979,	  Ledbetter	  applied	  for	  a	  position	  with	  the	  Goodyear	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Company	  at	  a	  local	  Goodyear	  tire	  factory.	  For	  the	  next	  nineteen	  years,	  Ledbetter	  would	  work	  alongside	  men	  and	  be	  one	  of	  the	  first	  women	  hired	  at	  management	  level.	  In	  1998,	  Ledbetter	  was	  left	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Lahle	  Wolfe,	  Personal	  Biography	  of	  Lilly	  Ledbetter,	  Women	  in	  Business	  Profile	  (web.	  accessed	  March,	  2015)	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anonymous	  note	  in	  her	  locker	  that	  disclosed	  she	  was	  earning	  significantly	  less	  than	  men	  in	  the	  same	  position.	  In	  March	  of	  that	  same	  year,	  Ledbetter	  submitted	  a	  questionnaire	  to	  the	  Equal	  Opportunity	  Employment	  Commission	  (EEOC),	  and	  filed	  a	  formal	  charge	  in	  July.	  After	  she	  retired	  in	  November	  1998,	  Ledbetter	  officially	  filed	  suit	  against	  Goodyear	  asserting	  sex	  discrimination	  under	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964.8	  	  	   Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  states,	  ““It	  shall	  be	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  for	  an	  employer	  …	  to	  discriminate	  against	  any	  individual	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  compensation,	  terms,	  conditions,	  or	  privileges	  of	  employment,	  because	  of	  such	  individual’s	  race,	  color,	  religion,	  sex,	  or	  national	  origin.”9	  At	  the	  District	  Court,	  Ledbetter	  argued	  that	  she	  was	  given	  a	  lower	  salary	  because	  her	  supervisors	  gave	  her	  poor	  evaluations	  due	  to	  her	  sex,	  and	  that	  a	  fair	  evaluation	  would	  have	  found	  her	  in	  equal	  standing	  to	  her	  male	  colleagues.	  Further,	  she	  argued	  that	  this	  damage	  compounded	  upon	  itself	  over	  time,	  and	  resulting	  in	  a	  significant	  wage	  inequality	  by	  the	  end	  of	  her	  nearly	  two	  decades	  with	  Goodyear.10	  The	  jury	  found	  for	  Ledbetter,	  dismissing	  Goodyear’s	  claim	  that	  the	  evaluations	  had	  been	  nondiscriminatory.11	  	   On	  the	  heels	  of	  Ledbetter’s	  victory,	  Goodyear	  appealed	  the	  holding	  of	  the	  District	  Court,	  arguing	  this	  time	  that	  Title	  VII	  pay	  discrimination	  claims	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Co.,	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  (2007)	  9	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  88-­‐352,	  78	  Stat.	  241	  §	  7,	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  2000e	  et	  seq	  (1964)	  10	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  11	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  
	   6	  
are	  time-­‐barred.12	  Goodyear	  argued	  that	  Ledbetter	  was	  required	  to	  bring	  her	  claim	  within	  180	  days	  of	  the	  discriminatory	  act.	  The	  discriminatory	  act,	  as	  Ledbetter	  described	  it,	  was	  a	  series	  of	  unfair	  poor	  evaluations	  given	  to	  her	  by	  her	  male	  supervisors	  between	  1979-­‐1981.	  In	  effect,	  Goodyear	  argued	  that	  Ledbetter	  had	  to	  prove	  that	  discriminatory	  action	  occurred	  between	  September	  26th,	  1997,	  and	  the	  day	  she	  filled	  out	  the	  EEOC	  questionnaire	  in	  1998.	  Using	  this	  argument,	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  reversed,	  holding	  that	  a	  Title	  VII	  pay	  discrimination	  claim	  “cannot	  be	  based	  on	  allegedly	  discriminatory	  events	  that	  occurred	  before	  the	  last	  pay	  decision	  that	  affected	  the	  employee’s	  pay	  during	  the	  EEOC	  charging	  period,”	  and	  that	  there	  was	  insufficient	  evidence	  to	  prove	  that	  Goodyear	  acted	  in	  a	  discriminatory	  manner	  in	  1997	  and	  1998.13	  The	  court	  held:	  “Because	  the	  latter	  effects	  of	  past	  discrimination	  do	  not	  restart	  the	  clock	  for	  filing	  the	  EEOC	  charge,	  Ledbetter’s	  claim	  is	  untimely.”14	  	  	   Ledbetter’s	  arguments	  at	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  were	  the	  same	  ones	  argued	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  on	  appeal.	  The	  language	  of	  Title	  VII	  states	  that	  the	  employee	  must	  first	  file	  an	  EEOC	  charge	  within	  180	  days	  “after	  the	  alleged	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  occurred.”15	  Ledbetter	  argued	  that	  paychecks	  she	  received	  within	  the	  lawful	  charging	  period	  of	  180	  days,	  along	  with	  a	  1998	  raise	  denial,	  each	  violated	  Title	  VII	  and	  each	  triggered	  a	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  13	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  14	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  15	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	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EEOC	  charging	  period.16	  Under	  this	  reasoning,	  Ledbetter	  asserted	  that	  she	  filed	  her	  EEOC	  claim	  well	  within	  multiple	  available	  charging	  periods	  that	  were	  triggered	  by	  multiple	  acts	  of	  discriminatory	  employment	  practices	  –	  the	  individual	  paychecks.	  Ledbetter	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  a	  “paycheck	  accrual”	  rule	  that	  could	  be	  found	  in	  Bazemore	  v.	  Friday,	  a	  1986	  Title	  VII	  disparate	  pay	  case.17	  In	  Bazemore,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  Title	  VII	  triggers	  a	  new	  EEOC	  charging	  period	  whenever	  the	  employer	  issues	  paychecks	  using	  a	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure.18	  The	  legal	  question	  for	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  to	  decide	  asks	  which	  types	  of	  actions	  by	  employers	  trigger	  a	  new	  charging	  period	  of	  180	  days,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  affected	  paychecks	  due	  to	  previous	  acts	  of	  explicit	  sex	  discrimination	  can	  be	  used	  as	  triggers.	  	  	   In	  response,	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  used	  as	  precedent	  United	  Airlines,	  
Inc.	  v.	  Evans19,	  Delaware	  State	  College	  v.	  Ricks20,	  Lorance	  v.	  AT&T	  Technologies,	  
Inc.21,	  and	  National	  Railroad	  Passenger	  Corporation	  v.	  Morgan22.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  triggering	  a	  new	  charging	  period	  must	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  “discrete	  unlawful	  practice.”23	  The	  Court	  wrote	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  discrete	  unlawful	  practice,	  the	  employer	  must	  engage	  in	  “separately	  actionable	  intentionally	  discriminatory	  acts”24.	  It	  is	  only	  if	  the	  act	  is	  separate,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  17	  Bazemore	  v.	  Friday,	  478	  U.S.	  385	  (1986)	  18	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  19	  United	  Airlines,	  Inc.	  v.	  Evans,	  431	  U.S.	  553	  (1977)	  20	  Delaware	  State	  College	  v.	  Ricks,	  449	  U.S.	  250	  (1980)	  21	  Lorance	  v.	  AT&T	  Technologies,	  Inc.,	  490	  U.S.	  900	  (1989)	  22	  National	  Railroad	  Passenger	  Corporation	  v.	  Morgan,	  536	  U.S.	  101	  (2002)	  23	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  24	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	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intentional,	  and	  discriminatory	  that	  a	  fresh	  violation	  takes	  place	  when	  each	  act	  is	  committed,	  and	  therefore	  triggers	  a	  new	  charging	  period25.	  “A	  new	  violation	  does	  not	  occur,	  and	  a	  new	  charging	  period	  does	  not	  commence,	  upon	  the	  occurrence	  of	  subsequent	  nondiscriminatory	  acts	  that	  entail	  adverse	  effects	  resulting	  from	  a	  past	  discrimination.”26	  To	  prove	  that	  the	  actions	  by	  Goodyear	  in	  Ledbetter	  were	  indeed	  not	  fresh	  violations,	  the	  Court	  explained	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  “paycheck	  accrual”	  rule	  was	  invalid.	  Referencing	  
Bazemore	  again,	  the	  Court	  focuses	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure	  versus	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  action	  that	  bears	  negative	  effects	  due	  to	  past	  discriminatory	  action	  outside	  of	  the	  charging	  period.	  “Because	  Ledbetter	  has	  not	  adduced	  evidence	  that	  Goodyear	  initially	  adopted	  its	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  system	  in	  order	  to	  discriminate	  based	  on	  sex	  or	  that	  it	  later	  applied	  this	  system	  to	  her	  within	  the	  charging	  period	  of	  discriminatory	  animus,	  Bazemore	  is	  no	  help	  to	  her.”27	  	  	   The	  very	  nuanced	  focus	  of	  the	  Court	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  of	  which	  acts	  trigger	  and	  which	  acts	  do	  not	  boils	  down,	  for	  them,	  to	  the	  question	  of	  discriminatory	  intent.	  The	  intent	  of	  the	  employer	  to	  discriminate	  against	  the	  employee	  is,	  as	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  understood	  it,	  paramount	  to	  understanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  Title	  VII.	  In	  Ledbetter,	  the	  lower	  court	  held	  that	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  an	  employer’s	  intent	  to	  discriminate,	  a	  discriminatory	  act	  must	  be	  defined	  as	  discriminatory	  by	  itself,	  separate	  from	  past	  intent.	  “It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  26	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  27	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	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is	  not,	  as	  Ledbetter	  contends,	  a	  ‘paycheck	  accrual	  rule’	  under	  which	  each	  paycheck,	  even	  if	  not	  accompanied	  by	  discriminatory	  intent,	  triggers	  a	  new	  EEOC	  charging	  period.”28	  Each	  paycheck	  that	  Ledbetter	  received	  after	  her	  manipulated	  evaluations	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  her	  work	  was	  indeed	  affected	  in	  a	  negative	  way.	  However,	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  did	  not	  see	  these	  paychecks	  as	  individually	  discriminatory	  on	  their	  face,	  and	  therefore	  not	  a	  part	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure.	  	  	   Lilly	  Ledbetter	  appealed	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.	  This	  time,	  her	  claim	  would	  be	  heard	  before	  the	  highest	  court	  in	  America,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  the	  very	  last	  chance	  to	  make	  her	  case.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  accepted	  
Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  for	  the	  October	  Term	  of	  2006.29	  Arguments	  by	  Ledbetter	  and	  Goodyear	  were	  heard	  on	  November	  27th,	  2006,	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  was	  handed	  down	  on	  May	  29th,	  2007.30	  By	  a	  5-­‐4	  vote,	  the	  Court	  upheld	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  finding	  in	  favor	  of	  Goodyear.	  The	  majority	  opinion,	  written	  by	  Justice	  Samuel	  Alito,	  found	  that	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  Ledbetter	  were	  indeed	  time-­‐barred	  by	  Title	  VII.	  	  	   In	  this	  way,	  Ledbetter	  lends	  itself	  powerfully	  to	  a	  study	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	  The	  majority	  opinion,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  argues	  staunchly	  against	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  Title	  VII.	  Justice	  Alito	  and	  the	  majority	  argue	  again	  and	  again	  for	  strict	  adherence	  to	  precedent,	  and	  a	  narrow,	  textualist	  understanding	  of	  the	  language	  in	  this	  statute.	  For	  the	  five	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  29	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	  	  30	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  syllabus	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members	  of	  the	  Court	  who	  found	  against	  Ledbetter,	  the	  legal	  question	  before	  them	  was	  nuanced,	  but	  simple.	  The	  filing	  period	  was	  explicitly	  written	  into	  the	  language	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  Ledbetter’s	  interpretation	  of	  its	  meaning	  was	  unsubstantiated	  because	  it	  deviated	  too	  far	  from	  a	  strict	  understanding	  of	  its	  meaning.	  Justice	  Alito	  writes,	  “We	  apply	  the	  statute	  as	  written,	  and	  this	  means	  that	  any	  unlawful	  employment	  practice,	  including	  those	  involving	  compensation,	  must	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  EEOC	  within	  the	  period	  prescribed	  by	  the	  statute.”31	  Justice	  Ruth	  Bader	  Ginsburg	  wrote	  for	  the	  4-­‐person	  dissent,	  and	  in	  a	  highly	  unorthodox	  showing	  of	  opposition,	  chose	  to	  read	  her	  opinion	  aloud	  from	  the	  bench.	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  fiery	  disagreement	  with	  the	  majority	  opinion	  was	  not	  only	  noteworthy	  in	  its	  delivery,	  but	  also	  its	  contents.	  The	  dissent,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  presented	  by	  the	  majority.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  her	  Ledbetter	  decision,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  wrote,	  “Once	  again,	  the	  ball	  is	  in	  Congress’s	  court.	  As	  in	  1991,	  the	  Legislature	  may	  act	  to	  correct	  this	  Court’s	  parsimonious	  reading	  of	  Title	  VII.”32	  This	  direct	  conversation	  with	  Congress	  was	  not	  novel;	  as	  the	  opinion	  stated,	  this	  had	  happened	  before	  in	  a	  series	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  1980’s	  concerning	  Title	  VII	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991.	  In	  order	  to	  create	  meaningful	  change	  in	  line	  with	  Title	  VII’s	  intended	  “broad	  remedial	  measures,”33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  24	  	  32	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  33	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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Congress	  had	  to	  pick	  up	  where	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  left	  off.	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  call	  to	  action	  is	  not	  only	  relevant	  in	  Ledbetter	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  Congressional	  override,	  but	  important	  to	  note	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  dissent’s	  understanding	  of	  Title	  VII.	  The	  focus	  on	  “broad	  remedial	  measures”	  clearly	  breaks	  away	  from	  the	  majority’s	  prescriptive	  view	  of	  the	  statute,	  and	  adds	  a	  layer	  of	  interpretation	  that	  the	  majority	  did	  not	  recognize.	  For	  Ginsburg	  and	  the	  dissenters,	  laws	  represent	  values,	  and	  these	  values	  must	  be	  pursued	  during	  interpretation	  and	  application.	  	  For	  Ginsburg,	  the	  only	  remedy	  for	  the	  majority’s	  cramped	  understanding	  of	  Title	  VII	  would	  be	  for	  them	  to	  pick	  up	  where	  her	  dissent	  left	  off.	  Lawmakers	  did	  indeed	  pick	  up	  the	  hypothetical	  ball,	  and	  a	  response	  was	  almost	  immediate.	  In	  July	  of	  2007,	  just	  two	  months	  after	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  opinion	  was	  handed	  down,	  lawmakers	  attempted	  to	  pass	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007.34	  This	  act	  would	  amend	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  to	  abolish	  the	  time	  restrictions	  in	  Title	  VII,	  and	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  decision	  made	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear.	  The	  bill	  made	  it	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  with	  93	  co-­‐sponsors,	  all	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Party.	  The	  final	  vote	  in	  the	  House	  was	  225	  yeas	  to	  199	  nays.	  The	  clearly	  partisan	  nature	  of	  the	  bill	  at	  this	  time	  became	  painfully	  evident	  as	  the	  bill	  moved	  to	  the	  Senate,	  where	  it	  did	  not	  pass.35	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  Congress	  were	  not	  so	  easily	  dissuaded,	  however,	  and	  supporters	  brought	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  “H.R.2831	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007,”	  Congress.gov	  	  35	  “H.R.2831	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007,”	  Congress.gov	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before	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  during	  the	  111th	  Congress	  in	  January	  of	  2009.36	  Upon	  reaching	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  once	  again,	  the	  bill	  passed	  with	  250	  in	  support	  and	  177	  against.37	  Of	  the	  250	  in	  support	  of	  the	  new	  bill,	  only	  three	  were	  from	  the	  Republican	  Party;	  five	  Democrats	  joined	  a	  majority	  of	  Republicans	  in	  voting	  against	  the	  bill.38	  	  The	  bill	  reached	  the	  Senate,	  passing	  with	  a	  narrow	  margin:	  61	  supported	  while	  36	  opposed,	  and	  1	  senator,	  Senator	  Ted	  Kennedy	  of	  Massachusetts,	  did	  not	  vote	  due	  to	  his	  ailing	  health.39	  This	  time	  the	  bill	  passed	  through	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate,	  and	  became	  the	  first	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  newly	  sworn	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  would	  sign	  into	  law.40	  	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  track	  and	  analyze	  the	  inception,	  growth,	  and	  life	  of	  the	  legal	  arguments	  found	  in	  the	  opinions	  in	  Ledbetter,	  as	  they	  are	  useful	  as	  a	  case	  study	  in	  opposing	  philosophies	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  discuss	  in	  great	  detail	  the	  legal	  rationale	  behind	  the	  opinions	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  birth	  of	  Goodyear’s	  legal	  arguments	  surrounding	  Title	  VII	  at	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.	  Chapter	  3	  will	  analyze	  how	  the	  petitioner	  and	  the	  respondent	  framed	  their	  arguments	  differently,	  and	  how	  these	  competing	  interpretations	  of	  Title	  VII	  came	  to	  light	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  Chapter	  4	  will	  then	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  precedent	  case	  law	  that	  Justice	  Alito	  choose	  to	  support	  his	  interpretation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  “S.181	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,”	  Congress.gov	  	  37	  S.181	  –	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  Senate	  Vote	  Roll	  (2009)	  38	  S.181	  Senate	  Vote	  Roll	  	  39	  S.181	  Senate	  Vote	  Roll	  	  40	  Stolberg,	  Obama	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of	  Title	  VII,	  and	  an	  analysis	  of	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  rebuttal	  to	  these	  cases.	  This	  is	  necessary	  because	  it	  will	  illustrate	  the	  types	  of	  cases	  Justice	  Alito	  choose,	  their	  relationship	  to	  Ledbetter,	  and	  how	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  broke	  down	  each	  and	  every	  one	  of	  these	  arguments	  to	  create	  a	  path	  for	  Congress	  to	  act.	  Chapter	  5	  will	  then	  holistically	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  difference	  of	  opinion	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  how	  it	  affected	  the	  reading	  of	  Title	  VII	  for	  the	  justices.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  and	  how	  all	  roads	  led	  back	  to	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  arguments	  in	  
Ledbetter.	  In	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear,	  this	  Supreme	  Court	  question	  became	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  of	  great	  social	  and	  historical	  importance.	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  as	  a	  justice,	  advocated	  powerfully	  from	  the	  bench	  for	  women’s	  pay	  equality,	  and	  her	  voice	  was	  joined	  by	  those	  in	  Congress	  and	  the	  White	  House.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  







Chapter	  1:	  The	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  	  	   	  	  	   When	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  filed	  her	  claim	  of	  sex	  discrimination	  against	  Goodyear,	  her	  case	  was	  heard	  before	  the	  United	  States	  District	  Court	  in	  the	  Northern	  District	  of	  Alabama.41	  She	  filed	  this	  lawsuit	  on	  November	  24,	  1999.42	  There,	  tried	  by	  a	  jury	  of	  her	  peers,	  Goodyear	  was	  found	  responsible	  for	  the	  discrimination	  that	  had	  put	  Ledbetter’s	  salary	  behind	  those	  of	  similarly	  situated	  men	  at	  the	  same	  job.	  When	  Goodyear	  attempted	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  discrimination	  didn’t	  happen,	  this	  jury	  of	  fathers,	  mothers,	  bosses,	  and	  employees	  simply	  didn’t	  buy	  the	  argument.	  On	  this	  front,	  Goodyear	  had	  failed;	  for	  this	  jury,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  had	  been	  treated	  unfairly	  because	  she	  was	  a	  woman.	  	  The	  plaintiff	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  at	  the	  District	  Court	  met	  its	  burden,	  proving	  it	  was	  “more	  likely	  than	  not	  that	  Defendant	  paid	  Plaintiff	  and	  unequal	  salary	  because	  of	  her	  sex.”43	  Still,	  Goodyear	  contended	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  pay	  claim	  was	  barred	  by	  Title	  VII’s	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period	  requirement.	  Further,	  Goodyear	  argued	  that	  “no	  reasonable	  fact	  finder	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear,	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  1	  (2005)	  42	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  9	  43	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  9	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conclude	  that	  [Ledbetter’s]	  sex	  was	  a	  motivating	  factor	  in	  a	  salary	  decision	  made	  during	  the	  period	  covered	  by	  [the]	  EEOC	  charge.”44	  While	  not	  directly	  responding	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  had	  been	  discriminated	  against,	  Goodyear	  focuses	  on	  a	  different	  question.	  For	  Goodyear,	  the	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  was	  discriminated	  against,	  but	  rather	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  language	  of	  Title	  VII	  allows	  her	  to	  charge	  this	  discrimination	  at	  the	  time	  she	  did.	  	  This	  understanding	  framed	  the	  question	  in	  a	  very	  specific	  manner,	  and	  challenged	  the	  Court	  to	  see	  Ledbetter	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  meant	  to	  protect	  employers,	  rather	  than	  social	  justice	  for	  Ledbetter.	  Even	  though	  Goodyear	  attempted	  to	  frame	  the	  question	  around	  the	  charging	  period	  rule,	  the	  jury	  didn’t	  buy	  it.	  To	  Goodyear’s	  vocal	  arguments	  surrounding	  the	  time-­‐bar	  of	  180	  days,	  the	  District	  court	  simply	  responded,	  “the	  jury’s	  finding	  that	  Plaintiff	  was	  subjected	  to	  gender	  disparate	  salary	  is	  abundantly	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence.”45	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  District	  Court	  completely	  disregards	  the	  heart	  of	  Goodyear’s	  argument,	  and	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  explicitly	  address	  whether	  or	  not	  Ledbetter’s	  EEOC	  charge	  was	  time-­‐barred	  to	  protect	  the	  employer.	  The	  jury	  recommended	  $223,776	  in	  backpay,	  $4,662	  in	  mental	  anguish,	  and	  $3,285,979	  in	  punitive	  damages	  for	  Ledbetter.46	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  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	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  45	  Ledbetter	  421	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  1169,	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   When	  Goodyear	  appealed	  this	  decision,	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  found	  itself	  before	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.47	  Presiding	  Judges	  Tjoflat,	  Dubina,	  and	  Pryor	  heard	  oral	  arguments	  from	  both	  the	  appellant	  and	  appellee	  regarding	  Goodyear’s	  position	  that	  “Ledbetter	  may	  prevail	  only	  if	  she	  can	  prove	  that	  unlawful	  discrimination	  tainted	  an	  annual	  review	  of	  her	  salary	  made	  within	  180	  days	  of	  her	  filing	  a	  charge	  of	  discrimination	  with	  the	  EEOC.”48	  Because	  of	  the	  District	  Court’s	  evident	  disregard	  for	  Goodyear’s	  charging	  period	  argument,	  the	  question	  before	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  court	  focused	  solely	  on	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  requirement	  in	  “this	  species	  of	  disparate	  pay	  cases,”49	  involving	  an	  employer	  who	  conducts	  annual	  reviews.	  Interestingly,	  Goodyear	  also	  continually	  denied	  on	  appeal	  “that	  sex	  played	  any	  role	  in	  the	  setting	  of	  her	  salary.”50	  The	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  refused	  to	  adopt	  this	  position	  definitively,	  “because	  we	  need	  not	  do	  so	  to	  determine	  whether	  Goodyear	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  judgment	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.”51	  The	  jury	  had	  already	  found	  that	  Ledbetter	  had	  indeed	  been	  discriminated	  against,	  but	  for	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  these	  findings	  were	  irrelevant.	  They	  had	  fully	  and	  strictly	  adopted	  the	  framework	  set	  by	  Goodyear.	  At	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  Ledbetter	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  case	  about	  gender	  discrimination;	  Ledbetter	  became	  a	  case	  about	  the	  language	  of	  Title	  VII.	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  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  1	  48	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	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  49	  Ledbetter	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  1169,	  6	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   Judge	  Tjoflat,	  writing	  for	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  began	  the	  opinion	  by	  describing	  the	  Goodyear	  Gasden	  Plant,	  where	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  had	  worked.	  In	  this	  opinion,	  the	  Court	  explains	  in	  detail	  the	  structure	  of	  employment	  at	  the	  Gasden	  plant,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  authority.	  Simply,	  the	  tire	  plant	  employed	  “tire	  builders”	  who	  were	  unionized,	  hourly	  workers,	  supervised	  by	  floor-­‐level	  mangers	  called	  “area	  managers.”	  Ledbetter	  was	  an	  “area	  manager”	  by	  the	  time	  she	  retired.	  Above	  Ledbetter	  and	  the	  other	  area	  managers	  was	  a	  Business	  Center	  Manager,	  or	  BCM.	  Judge	  Tjoflat	  continues	  by	  describing	  the	  merit	  compensation	  system	  in	  place	  at	  the	  Gasden	  plant,	  in	  which	  BCMs	  would	  annually	  review	  all	  employees,	  including	  area	  managers,	  for	  merit-­‐based	  raises.52	  The	  background	  presented	  to	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  is	  relevant	  in	  this	  discussion	  because	  it	  highlights	  the	  incredibly	  narrow	  focus	  that	  this	  lower	  Court	  chose	  to	  pursue.	  Despite	  all	  of	  the	  facts	  that	  proved	  pertinent	  at	  the	  District	  Court,	  the	  circuit	  court	  focused	  entirely	  on	  the	  timely	  filing	  requirement	  and	  the	  burden	  on	  Ledbetter	  within	  the	  filing	  period.	  	  	   The	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  relied	  on	  a	  prior	  case,	  AMTRAK	  v.	  Morgan,53	  when	  considering	  the	  timely	  filing	  requirement.	  Morgan,	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  decided	  in	  2002,	  also	  concerned	  filing	  employment	  discrimination	  claims.	  Specifically,	  Morgan	  considered	  “whether,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances,	  a	  Title	  VII	  plaintiff	  may	  file	  suit	  on	  events	  that	  fall	  outside	  [the	  timely	  filing]	  period.”54	  The	  circuit	  court	  distinguished	  Morgan	  from	  Ledbetter,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  7	  53	  AMTRAK	  v.	  Morgan,	  536	  U.S.	  101	  (2002)	  54	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  12	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categorizing	  Morgan	  as	  a	  case	  involving	  hostile	  environments,	  while	  
Ledbetter	  concerns	  “discrete	  acts	  of	  discrimination.”	  Judge	  Tjoflat	  concedes	  that	  if	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  had	  chosen	  to	  focus	  primarily	  on	  a	  single	  instance	  of	  discrimination,	  a	  refusal	  of	  raise	  in	  1997,	  she	  would	  not	  be	  challenged	  by	  the	  timely-­‐filing	  rule.	  In	  Judge	  Tjoflat’s	  words,	  she	  would	  have	  been	  “limited	  the	  damages	  she	  could	  have	  recovered,	  rendered	  useless	  evidence	  relevant	  only	  to	  other	  persons	  in	  the	  plant	  upon	  which	  she	  wanted	  the	  jury	  to	  rely,	  and	  forced	  her	  to	  prove	  that	  [Goodyear]	  acted	  with	  discriminatory	  intent.”	  However,	  because	  Ledbetter	  is	  choosing	  to	  pursue	  discrimination	  on	  a	  larger	  scale,	  she	  is	  extrapolating	  her	  claim	  past	  what	  Title	  VII	  allows.	  Judge	  Tjoflat	  disregards	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  lower	  court	  and	  Ledbetter’s	  rationale	  because	  “what	  Ledbetter	  did	  –	  what	  the	  lower	  court	  allowed	  her	  to	  do	  –	  was	  to	  point	  to	  the	  substantial	  disparity	  between	  her	  salary	  and	  those	  of	  the	  male	  area	  managers	  in	  tire	  assembly…”55	  In	  the	  circuit	  court’s	  understanding	  of	  Title	  VII,	  Ledbetter	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  put	  at	  issue	  all	  salary-­‐related	  decisions	  during	  her	  employment	  at	  Goodyear,	  because	  that	  would	  “put	  an	  onus	  on	  Goodyear	  to	  provide	  a	  legitimate,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  reason	  for	  every	  dollar	  difference	  between	  her	  salary	  and	  her	  male	  co-­‐workers’	  salaries.”56	  	   Judge	  Tjoflat	  reasoned,	  “There	  must,	  however,	  be	  some	  limit	  on	  how	  far	  back	  to	  plaintiff	  can	  reach.	  If	  it	  were	  otherwise,	  the	  timely-­‐filing	  requirements	  would	  be	  completely	  illusory…”57	  While	  the	  court	  of	  appeals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  13	  56	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  13	  57	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  13	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agrees	  that	  Ledbetter	  could	  have	  charged	  Goodyear	  for	  the	  denial	  of	  raise	  in	  1997,	  it	  also	  agrees	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  when	  the	  plaintiff	  can	  reach	  past	  the	  180-­‐day	  filing	  period	  to	  prove	  discriminatory	  intent	  through	  a	  hostile	  environment	  or	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure.	  Here,	  the	  circuit	  court	  raises	  an	  important	  point	  that	  the	  petitioner’s	  brief	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  would	  address.	  While	  the	  circuit	  court	  agrees	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  period	  of	  time	  during	  which	  the	  petitioner	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  reach	  past	  the	  180-­‐day	  cycle,	  it	  does	  not	  create	  a	  standard	  “in	  the	  text	  of	  Title	  VII,	  or	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  this	  or	  any	  other	  court.”58	  Instead,	  the	  court	  of	  appeals	  decided,	  “an	  employee	  seeking	  to	  establish	  that	  his	  or	  her	  pay	  level	  was	  unlawfully	  depressed	  may	  look	  no	  further	  into	  the	  past	  than	  the	  last	  affirmative	  decision	  directly	  affecting	  the	  employee’s	  pay	  immediately	  preceding	  the	  start	  of	  the	  limitations	  period.”59	  	  	   The	  argument	  that	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  used	  to	  support	  Goodyear	  boils	  down	  to	  a	  question	  of	  technicality.	  A	  lawsuit	  that	  clearly	  highlighted	  the	  social	  issue	  of	  pay	  discrimination	  because	  of	  sex	  was	  reformulated	  and	  reframed	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  textualist	  statutory	  interpretation.	  For	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  Title	  VII	  is	  a	  text	  that	  demands	  strict	  obedience;	  the	  timely	  filing	  rule	  is	  restrictive	  so	  that	  it	  may	  protect	  employers	  from	  overdue	  claims.	  The	  court	  found	  that	  in	  order	  to	  win	  her	  case,	  Ledbetter	  had	  to	  prove	  her	  case	  within	  the	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period.	  Because	  Ledbetter	  was	  unable	  to	  meet	  this	  burden,	  and	  could	  not	  prove	  that	  the	  single	  denial	  of	  raise	  in	  1997	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  11	  59	  Ledbetter	  421	  F.3d	  1169,	  15	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had	  a	  discrete	  discriminatory	  intent,	  her	  case	  was	  lost.	  The	  circuit	  court	  reversed	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  lower	  court,	  and	  Ledbetter	  filed	  for	  appeal	  once	  more.	  	   The	  Court	  granted	  cert.	  on	  June	  26th,	  2006.60	  The	  merits	  briefs	  for	  the	  petitioner	  and	  respondent	  are	  framed	  so	  differently	  that	  they	  seem	  to	  focus	  on	  different	  facts,	  and	  certainly	  different	  arguments.	  The	  Petitioner’s	  statement	  framed	  Ledbetter	  as	  a	  case	  concerning	  social	  justice,	  civil	  rights,	  and	  corporate	  discrimination.	  Ledbetter	  argues	  that	  even	  thought	  the	  district	  court	  clearly	  found	  that	  “Goodyear	  Tire	  and	  Rubber	  Company	  was	  paying	  petitioner	  less	  than	  her	  male	  counterparts	  because	  of	  her	  sex,”61	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  chose	  to	  ignore	  this	  fact.	  Ledbetter	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  180-­‐day	  filing	  period	  described	  in	  Title	  VII,	  but	  rejects	  the	  court	  of	  appeals’	  understanding	  that	  the	  1997	  raise	  denial	  must	  be	  discriminatory	  on	  its	  face	  and	  isolated	  from	  other	  incidents.	  The	  Petitioner	  argues	  vehemently	  against	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Title	  VII,	  reasoning,	  “Goodyear	  could	  not	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  continuing	  to	  pay	  petitioner	  less	  than	  her	  male	  colleagues	  for	  equal	  work	  even	  if	  the	  jury	  properly	  concluded	  that	  this	  disparity	  was	  the	  result	  of	  intentional	  sex	  discrimination.”62	  Framed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  petitioner	  challenges	  the	  court	  to	  interpret	  the	  question	  in	  Ledbetter	  differently	  from	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  12	  61	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  2	  62	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	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   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Respondent’s	  brief	  frames	  the	  question	  in	  
Ledbetter	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  way.	  The	  counterstatement	  offered	  by	  Goodyear	  spends	  little	  to	  no	  time	  describing	  the	  facts	  of	  Ledbetter’s	  time	  as	  an	  employee	  at	  Goodyear.	  Instead,	  the	  respondent	  focuses	  heavily	  on	  what	  they	  understand	  as	  an	  unacceptable	  application	  of	  Title	  VII:	  “Ledbetter	  seeks	  to	  challenge	  the	  collective	  effects	  of	  those	  19	  years	  of	  salary	  determinations…”63	  The	  focus	  is	  immediately	  placed	  on	  the	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period,	  and	  stays	  concentrated	  on	  the	  technicality	  of	  this	  requirement.	  Without	  responding	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  discrimination	  or	  women’s	  rights	  arguments	  made	  by	  Ledbetter,	  Goodyear	  actively	  defends	  itself	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Ledbetter	  is	  attempting	  to	  sidestep	  a	  burden	  created	  for	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  Title	  VII.	  For	  Ledbetter,	  Goodyear	  is	  exemplary	  of	  corporate	  greed	  and	  injustice	  for	  women	  in	  the	  workplace,	  while	  for	  Goodyear,	  Ledbetter	  is	  trying	  to	  shirk	  her	  responsibility	  as	  written	  into	  the	  law.	  For	  Ledbetter,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  social	  justice;	  for	  Goodyear,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  law.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  overall	  framing	  of	  her	  argument,	  Ledbetter	  doesn’t	  rely	  solely	  on	  arguments	  appealing	  to	  emotionality	  and	  gender	  equality;	  the	  petitioner’s	  brief	  focuses	  heavily	  on	  precedent	  to	  make	  their	  case.	  “In	  
National	  Railroad	  Passenger	  Corp.	  v.	  Morgan64	  this	  court	  held	  that	  recurring	  violations	  of	  Title	  VII	  are	  separately	  actionable	  and	  that	  a	  new	  limitations	  period	  arises	  for	  each	  repetition	  of	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice.”65	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Resp’t	  Br.	  2	  64	  Morgan	  536	  U.S.	  101	  (2002)	  65	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  for	  Petitioner	  13	  
	   22	  
petitioner	  defines	  “employment	  practice”	  as	  the	  Court	  did	  in	  Bazemore	  v.	  
Friday66.	  In	  Bazemore,	  the	  Court	  held,	  “an	  employer	  commits	  a	  discrete	  violation	  of	  Title	  VII	  each	  and	  every	  time	  it	  pays	  similarly	  situated	  employees	  differently	  for	  a	  discriminatory	  reason	  prohibited	  by	  the	  statute.”67	  Under	  this	  reasoning,	  Ledbetter	  argued	  that	  Bazemore	  and	  Morgan	  together	  create	  a	  standard	  for	  timely	  filing	  that	  Judge	  Tjoflat	  inappropriately	  interpreted	  at	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.	  This	  standard	  is	  faithful	  to	  precedent,	  and	  orders	  that	  “each	  paycheck	  that	  offers	  a	  woman	  less	  pay	  than	  a	  similarly	  situated	  man	  because	  of	  her	  sex	  is	  a	  separate	  violation	  of	  Title	  VII	  with	  its	  own	  limitations	  period,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  paycheck	  simply	  implements	  prior	  discriminatory	  decision	  made	  outside	  the	  limitations	  period.”68	  	  	   Next,	  Ledbetter	  argues	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  Morgan	  and	  Bazemore	  set	  by	  the	  Court	  comports	  with	  the	  language	  and	  purposes	  of	  Title	  VII.	  Here	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  petitioner	  and	  the	  respondent.	  While	  both	  must	  be	  faithful	  to	  precedent,	  Ledbetter	  is	  the	  only	  party	  that	  attempts	  to	  argue	  about	  legislative	  intent	  with	  regard	  to	  statutory	  interpretation.	  In	  each	  precedent	  case,	  the	  Court	  opted	  to	  protect	  the	  employee	  from	  discrimination	  with	  respect	  to	  compensation.	  The	  petitioner	  argues,	  “The	  most	  natural	  reading	  of	  this	  language	  is	  that	  Congress	  intended	  to	  prohibit	  the	  actual	  payment	  of	  disparate	  wages	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex	  or	  race,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  478	  U.S.	  385	  (1986)	  67	  Brief	  for	  Petitioner	  13	  68	  Brief	  for	  Petitioner	  13	  
	   23	  
not	  simply	  the	  decision	  to	  pay	  a	  disparate	  wage.”69	  The	  real-­‐life	  application	  of	  Title	  VII	  is	  a	  major	  point	  of	  argument	  for	  Ledbetter,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  a	  point	  that	  the	  respondent	  can	  effectively	  argue	  against.	  As	  written	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  
Albemarle	  Paper	  Co.	  v.	  Moody70,	  “the	  purpose	  of	  Title	  VII	  is	  to	  make	  persons	  whole	  for	  injuries	  suffered	  on	  account	  of	  unlawful	  employment	  discrimination.”	  The	  rule	  suggested	  by	  the	  petitioner	  is	  faithful	  to	  these	  purposes,	  and	  Ledbetter	  argues	  that	  it	  should	  therefore	  be	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  Ledbetter	  should	  be	  decided.	  	  	   Further,	  the	  Petitioner	  substantially	  argues	  for	  the	  realities	  of	  workplace	  discrimination.	  Ledbetter	  considers	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit	  rule	  unreasonable,	  pointing	  out	  that	  unless	  an	  employee	  seeks	  relief	  within	  six	  months,	  “she	  may	  never	  seek	  even	  prospective	  relief	  and	  must	  quit	  her	  job	  and	  find	  a	  new	  one	  in	  order	  to	  regain	  an	  enforceable	  right	  to	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work.”71	  This	  expectation	  is	  certainly	  unreasonable,	  but	  Ledbetter	  argues	  that	  under	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit’s	  judgment,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  real	  threat	  to	  women	  working	  in	  America	  because	  “many	  of	  the	  post-­‐Bazemore	  cases	  involve	  discrimination	  in	  the	  assignment	  of	  an	  employee’s	  initial	  salary.”	  In	  addition,	  “[F]ew	  employees	  are	  willing	  to	  begin	  their	  first	  six	  months	  of	  employment	  by	  filing	  a	  charge,”	  and	  “New	  employees	  may	  be	  grateful	  just	  to	  have	  a	  job,	  are	  likely	  to	  gave	  less	  support	  from	  their	  new	  co-­‐workers.”72	  While	  an	  employee	  would	  ideally	  file	  within	  six	  months	  of	  the	  perceived	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  22	  70	  Moody	  422	  U.S.	  405,	  418	  (1975)	  71	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  25	  72	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  25	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discrimination,	  Ledbetter	  argues	  that	  “her	  understandable	  reluctance	  to	  do	  so	  should	  not	  condemn	  the	  employee	  to	  a	  career	  as	  a	  second-­‐class	  employee.”73	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly	  in	  a	  case	  like	  Ledbetter,	  her	  status	  as	  a	  minority	  female	  in	  a	  majority	  male	  work	  environment	  certainly	  may	  have	  prevented	  her	  from	  complaining.	  Indeed,	  Ledbetter	  discloses	  that	  her	  own	  supervisor	  called	  her	  a	  “troublemaker,”	  and	  said	  that	  the	  “plant	  did	  not	  need	  women.”74	  	   Finally,	  Ledbetter	  explained	  that	  for	  disparate	  pay	  issues,	  delays	  in	  charging	  should	  not	  only	  be	  accepted,	  but	  also	  expected.	  Simply,	  she	  argues	  that	  this	  delay	  is	  due	  to	  “the	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  the	  pay	  received	  by	  fellow	  employees	  and	  the	  justification	  for	  any	  disparities.”75	  The	  lack	  of	  notice	  for	  employees	  regarding	  their	  pay	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  co-­‐workers	  is	  simply	  a	  reality	  of	  having	  a	  job.	  It	  is	  not	  at	  all	  uncommon,	  as	  Ledbetter	  argues,	  for	  companies	  to	  keep	  pay	  levels	  confidential,	  or	  for	  workers	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  share	  salary	  information	  with	  others.	  “In	  such	  cases,	  the	  plaintiff	  will	  have	  little	  reason	  even	  to	  suspect	  discrimination.”76	  In	  Ledbetter’s	  case,	  she	  was	  not	  made	  aware	  of	  her	  pay	  discrepancy	  until	  significantly	  after	  the	  initial	  discrete	  act	  of	  discrimination	  had	  happened.	  To	  hold	  her	  to	  the	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period	  would	  not	  only	  be	  unreasonable,	  but	  unjust.	  	  	   The	  respondent	  makes	  no	  such	  argument.	  Justice,	  fairness,	  and	  rights	  are	  not	  at	  all	  argued	  by	  Goodyear.	  Instead,	  Goodyear	  continues	  to	  focus	  on	  a	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  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  25	  74	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  8	  75	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  26	  76	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	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very	  technical	  portion	  of	  Title	  VII.	  They,	  too,	  rely	  on	  precedent,	  but	  argue	  that	  
Ledbetter	  is	  easily	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  winning	  plaintiffs	  in	  Bazemore	  and	  Morgan.	  Goodyear	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  repeating	  over	  and	  over	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  claim	  is	  time-­‐barred,	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  conflate	  past	  discrimination	  with	  alleged	  discriminatory	  pay	  checks	  during	  the	  charging	  period	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  law.	  Ledbetter	  had	  argued	  for	  the	  language	  and	  purposes	  of	  Title	  VII	  as	  a	  law	  representing	  values,	  and	  Goodyear	  argues,	  “To	  honor	  both	  the	  text	  and	  the	  purposes	  of	  section	  706(e),	  this	  Court	  has	  repeatedly	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  identify	  the	  
precise	  ‘unlawful	  employment	  practice’	  at	  issue.”77	  Approaching	  the	  same	  argument	  from	  conflicting	  sides,	  Goodyear	  frames	  the	  issue	  as	  one	  of	  following	  the	  rules	  and	  respecting	  the	  text	  of	  Title	  VII	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  text.	  	  	   Goodyear	  further	  describes	  Ledbetter’s	  focus	  on	  equal	  pay	  for	  women	  as	  a	  “policy	  argument”	  that	  the	  Court	  cannot	  use	  to	  inform	  their	  reading	  of	  Title	  VII.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  women	  receive	  lower	  salaries,	  are	  often	  in	  male	  dominated	  industries,	  and	  face	  discrimination,	  Goodyear	  argues	  that	  these	  issues	  are	  separate	  from	  Title	  VII	  and	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  in	  Ledbetter	  because	  they	  are	  not	  instructive	  for	  statutory	  interpretation.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  the	  greatest	  disagreement	  between	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  the	  respondent.	  Goodyear	  attacks	  Ledbetter’s	  “sweeping	  assertions”78	  about	  the	  discrimination	  she	  faced	  as	  unsupported,	  and	  cites	  certain	  years	  when	  she	  received	  higher	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  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Resp’t	  Br.	  9	  78	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	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raises	  than	  her	  male	  counterparts.	  The	  respondent	  also	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  consider	  policy	  questions,	  but	  rather	  to	  apply	  the	  law	  as	  written	  by	  Congress.	  Because	  Congress	  has	  passed	  legislation	  such	  as	  the	  Equal	  Pay	  Act	  and	  Title	  VII,	  Goodyear	  considers	  this	  to	  be	  enough	  attention	  paid	  to	  protect	  employees	  who	  are	  being	  treated	  unfairly.	  Finally,	  Goodyear	  argues	  that	  Ledbetter	  is	  unreasonably	  asking	  the	  Court	  to	  rewrite	  Title	  VII	  so	  that	  it	  would	  favor	  her	  right	  to	  challenge	  past	  acts,	  against	  precedent	  and	  a	  strict	  reading	  of	  the	  text.	  	  	   Without	  explicitly	  saying	  so,	  both	  Goodyear	  and	  Ledbetter	  frame	  their	  arguments	  around	  opposing	  philosophies	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	  One,	  textualism,	  is	  an	  adherence	  to	  the	  law	  as	  a	  text,	  and	  clearly	  distinguishes	  the	  judge’s	  job	  as	  that	  of	  a	  translator.	  Another,	  what	  Justice	  Steven	  Breyer	  describes	  as	  “active	  liberty,”79	  asks	  that	  judges	  consider	  the	  values	  that	  lawmakers	  intended	  to	  embody	  in	  the	  text	  of	  law.	  In	  the	  oral	  arguments	  and	  opinions	  to	  follow	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear,	  the	  delineation	  between	  these	  two	  schools	  of	  thought	  becomes	  loudly	  evident.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Steven	  Breyer,	  Active	  Liberty	  (Alfred	  A.	  Knopf,	  NY	  2005)	  







Chapter	  2:	  Framing	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Opinions	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  was	  a	  landmark	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  outlawed	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  color,	  religion,	  sex,	  or	  national	  origin.80	  Title	  VII	  of	  this	  law	  prohibits	  employers	  from	  discriminating	  against	  their	  employees	  because	  of	  these	  qualities,	  and	  outlines	  the	  requirements	  for	  employees	  who	  may	  choose	  to	  bring	  suit	  against	  employers	  for	  violating	  these	  conditions.	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  is	  a	  highly	  nuanced	  exercise	  in	  statutory	  interpretation.	  A	  central	  question	  is	  whether	  Ledbetter	  meet	  her	  burden	  as	  outlined	  in	  Title	  VII.	  At	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  storm	  is	  the	  justices’	  understanding	  of	  the	  text,	  and	  how	  they	  believe	  it	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  Ledbetter’s	  case.	  	  	   Title	  VII,	  under	  a	  category	  entitled	  “Unlawful	  Employment	  Practices,”	  states,	  “It	  shall	  be	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  for	  an	  employer	  to	  fail	  or	  refuse	  to	  hire	  or	  to	  discharge	  any	  individual,	  or	  otherwise	  to	  discriminate	  against	  any	  individual	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  compensation,	  terms,	  conditions,	  or	  privileges	  of	  employment,	  because	  of	  such	  individual’s	  race,	  color,	  religion,	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  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  88-­‐352,	  78	  Stat.	  241	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sex,	  or	  national	  origin.”81	  Under	  this	  law,	  employers	  like	  Goodyear	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  discriminate	  with	  regard	  to	  any	  employee’s	  hiring,	  discharging,	  compensation,	  terms,	  conditions,	  or	  privileges	  of	  employment	  because	  of	  race,	  sex,	  or	  nationality.	  In	  Ledbetter	  the	  original	  issue	  surrounds	  Goodyear’s	  alleged	  violation	  of	  Title	  VII,	  in	  discriminating	  against	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  by	  paying	  her	  less	  than	  her	  male	  counterparts	  because	  of	  her	  sex.	  	  	   As	  described	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  however,	  this	  issue	  changed	  on	  appeal	  at	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit,	  as	  the	  question	  no	  longer	  concerned	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  actual	  discrimination	  happened,	  but	  rather	  whether	  or	  not	  Ledbetter	  fulfilled	  her	  burden	  as	  the	  plaintiff.	  Indeed,	  Title	  VII	  states	  that	  civil	  action	  taken	  under	  “Unlawful	  Employment	  Practices”	  must	  be	  filed	  with	  the	  Equal	  Employment	  Opportunity	  Commission	  “within	  one	  hundred	  and	  eighty	  days	  after	  the	  alleged	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  occurred.”82	  On	  appeal,	  
Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  changed	  from	  a	  case	  focused	  on	  the	  injustices	  against	  Ledbetter	  to	  a	  case	  questioning	  her	  fulfillment	  of	  this	  one	  hundred	  and	  eighty	  day	  charging	  period	  requirement.	  While	  Ledbetter	  maintained	  that	  she	  did	  fulfill	  this	  requirement,	  Goodyear	  argued	  that	  she	  did	  not,	  and	  her	  argument	  fell	  short	  of	  the	  law’s	  enforcement	  provision.	  	  	  	   When	  the	  central	  issue	  of	  Ledbetter	  changed,	  so	  did	  its	  legal	  focus.	  Ledbetter	  conceded	  that	  the	  most	  egregious	  sex	  discrimination	  against	  her	  happened	  years	  before	  she	  filed	  with	  the	  EEOC,	  and	  fell	  significantly	  outside	  of	  the	  allotted	  charging	  period.	  However,	  she	  argued	  that	  compensation	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  2000e-­‐2.	  [Section	  703]	  82	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  Title	  VII	  SEC.	  2000e-­‐5.	  [Section	  706]	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pay	  is	  different	  in	  nature	  from	  other	  “discrete	  acts	  of	  discrimination”	  like	  termination	  or	  failure	  to	  hire	  because	  pay	  is	  recurring	  and	  oftentimes	  compounding.	  Using	  precedent,	  Ledbetter	  brought	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  the	  argument	  that	  for	  issues	  of	  compensation,	  each	  individual	  paycheck	  is	  its	  own	  discrete	  act	  of	  discrimination	  if	  it	  is	  negatively	  affected	  by	  previous	  pay	  decisions,	  even	  if	  those	  decisions	  were	  outside	  of	  the	  charging	  period.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  was	  paid	  within	  the	  one	  hundred	  and	  eighty	  day	  period,	  that	  single	  negatively	  affected	  paycheck	  could	  qualify	  as	  the	  “alleged	  unlawful	  employment	  practice”	  required	  by	  Title	  VII.	  Goodyear	  disagreed	  with	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  law,	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  a	  skewed	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text.	  According	  to	  the	  employer,	  Ledbetter	  had	  to	  point	  to	  a	  specific,	  isolated,	  and	  intentional	  act	  of	  sex	  discrimination	  within	  the	  charging	  period	  in	  order	  to	  file	  suit.	  	  	   At	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  Justice	  Alito	  and	  the	  majority	  found	  in	  favor	  of	  Goodyear.	  They	  agreed	  with	  the	  respondent’s	  argument	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  argument	  was	  unfaithful	  and	  inconsistent	  with	  precedent	  case	  law.	  A	  careful	  dissection	  of	  the	  arguments	  contained	  therein	  is	  a	  tale	  of	  two	  interpretations.	  The	  Majority	  and	  the	  Dissent	  frame	  their	  arguments	  differently,	  as	  the	  merits	  briefs	  did,	  and	  approach	  the	  text	  with	  distinctly	  contrasting	  methods.	  Statutory	  interpretation	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  many	  issues	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  but	  it	  is	  especially	  prominent	  in	  cases	  like	  Ledbetter,	  when	  the	  questions	  before	  the	  Court	  are	  so	  technical	  and	  so	  dependent	  on	  the	  specific	  wording	  of	  the	  text.	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For	  Goodyear,	  and	  for	  the	  majority,	  this	  was	  a	  cut	  and	  dried	  case	  of	  textualist	  interpretation.	  The	  text	  calls	  for	  “discrete	  acts	  of	  discrimination,”	  so	  that	  is	  what	  the	  Court	  must	  narrow	  its	  search	  to	  accommodate.	  The	  text	  calls	  for	  a	  one	  hundred	  and	  eighty	  day	  charging	  period,	  so	  any	  deviation	  from	  that	  would	  interrupt	  the	  very	  integrity	  of	  Congress’s	  power	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  For	  Ledbetter,	  and	  for	  the	  dissenters,	  the	  law	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  text;	  they	  are	  not	  textualists,	  because	  they	  understand	  the	  law	  to	  embody	  values	  and	  larger	  purposes	  than	  word	  choice	  and	  strict	  textualism.	  To	  these	  judges,	  to	  interpret	  law	  based	  on	  the	  greater	  values	  that	  the	  lawmakers	  intended	  is	  not	  only	  the	  correct	  method	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  only	  method	  that	  allows	  judges	  to	  participate	  fully	  and	  truly	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  	   Famously,	  in	  1997,	  Justice	  Antonin	  Scalia	  wrote	  a	  book	  entitled	  A	  
Matter	  of	  Interpretation83	  about	  his	  philosophy	  of	  statutory	  and	  constitutional	  interpretation.	  This	  text	  is	  a	  paradigm	  of	  textualist	  thought,	  and	  Scalia	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best-­‐known	  strictly	  textualist	  member	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  A	  Matter	  of	  Interpretation	  champions	  the	  philosophy	  of	  textualist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  single	  best	  way	  for	  judges	  to	  respect	  the	  American	  democratic	  process.	  In	  2005,	  Justice	  Stephen	  Breyer	  wrote	  a	  book	  in	  response	  to	  Scalia’s	  textualist	  approach	  called	  Active	  Liberty.	  Breyer	  argues	  against	  Scalia’s	  claim	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  interpret	  a	  law	  as	  a	  fixed	  text.	  Instead,	  Breyer	  adopts	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Antonin	  Scalia,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Interpretation	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton,	  NJ	  1998)	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view	  that	  judges	  have	  a	  more	  involved	  role	  in	  statutory	  interpretation.	  This	  role	  is	  what	  Breyer	  calls	  “active	  liberty,”84	  a	  philosophy	  that	  encourages	  judges	  to	  understand	  laws	  as	  an	  embodiment	  of	  values	  held	  by	  the	  lawmakers.	  In	  his	  view,	  judges	  have	  the	  obligation	  to	  understand	  laws	  as	  more	  than	  the	  language	  of	  the	  text.	  He	  implores	  them	  to	  interpret	  the	  values	  held	  within	  the	  law	  and	  engage	  in	  active	  liberty	  so	  they	  can	  fully	  participate	  properly	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  These	  often	  competing	  philosophies	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  many	  of	  the	  cases	  that	  come	  before	  the	  Court.	  While	  not	  all	  of	  the	  justices	  are	  as	  committed	  to	  one	  or	  another	  as	  Scalia	  and	  Breyer,	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  is	  divided	  exactly	  on	  these	  lines.	  Ledbetter	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  	  	   Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  textualist	  camp.	  The	  explicit	  necessity	  in	  Ledbetter	  for	  close	  statutory	  interpretation	  is	  the	  perfect	  case	  study	  for	  the	  philosophy	  that	  Justice	  Antonin	  Scalia	  championed	  in	  A	  
Matter	  of	  Interpretation.85	  Scalia’s	  strict	  adherence	  to	  this	  philosophy	  requires	  him	  the	  assert	  that	  “[w]ords	  do	  have	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  meaning,	  and	  no	  interpretation	  that	  goes	  beyond	  that	  range	  is	  permissible.”86	  While	  Justice	  Scalia	  did	  not	  write	  the	  majority	  opinion	  in	  Ledbetter,	  Justice	  Alito’s	  opinion	  reflects	  perfectly	  this	  principle.	  Of	  course,	  Scalia	  did	  sign	  on	  to	  the	  majority	  opinion,	  along	  with	  justices	  Thomas,	  Kennedy,	  and	  Roberts.	  The	  dissent,	  led	  by	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  saw	  Ledbetter	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  light.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Breyer,	  Active	  Liberty	  85	  Scalia,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Interpretation	  86	  Scalia,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Interpretation,	  24	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Because	  of	  the	  social	  significance	  of	  both	  Title	  VII	  and	  the	  actual	  facts	  of	  Ledbetter’s	  case,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  repeated	  again	  and	  again	  arguments	  that	  supported	  Justice	  Breyer’s	  philosophy	  of	  active	  liberty.	  For	  the	  dissent,	  Title	  VII	  was	  about	  more	  than	  the	  words	  on	  the	  page	  –	  it	  was	  about	  the	  pursuit	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  the	  objectives	  that	  Congress	  expected	  to	  achieve	  by	  passing	  this	  law.	  	  	   In	  both	  the	  majority	  opinion	  and	  the	  dissenting	  opinion,	  Justices	  Alito	  and	  Ginsburg	  discuss	  and	  argue	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  precedent	  for	  
Ledbetter.	  Because	  cases	  involving	  Title	  VII	  and	  the	  charging	  period	  question	  have	  been	  raised	  before	  the	  Court	  previously,	  both	  sides	  agree	  that	  understanding	  relevant	  case	  law	  is	  instructive	  for	  the	  decision	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  differences	  begin	  when	  Justices	  Alito	  and	  Ginsburg	  frame	  and	  analyze	  the	  rationale	  of	  each	  precedent	  case.	  At	  times,	  the	  majority	  and	  the	  dissent	  understand	  precedent	  so	  differently	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  check	  that	  they	  are	  referencing	  the	  same	  case.	  This,	  again,	  can	  be	  attributed	  directly	  to	  competing	  philosophies	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	  	  	   Justice	  Alito	  begins	  by	  explaining	  that	  Ledbetter	  “calls	  upon	  us	  to	  apply	  established	  precedent	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  context”87.	  The	  legal	  question	  in	  Ledbetter	  considers	  is	  “[w]hether	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  a	  plaintiff	  may	  bring	  an	  action	  under	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  alleging	  illegal	  pay	  discrimination	  when	  the	  disparate	  pay	  is	  received	  during	  the	  statutory	  limitations	  period,	  but	  is	  the	  result	  of	  intentionally	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discriminatory	  pay	  decisions	  that	  occurred	  outside	  the	  limitations	  period.”88	  The	  words	  that	  the	  textualists	  considered	  in	  Ledbetter	  were	  contained	  in	  Title	  VII;	  the	  law	  requires	  the	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period,	  so	  any	  extension	  of	  that	  period	  must	  find	  merit	  in	  precedent.	  Alito’s	  opinion	  in	  this	  case	  clearly	  focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  language	  of	  relevant	  case	  law	  and	  statutes.	  For	  the	  majority,	  Ledbetter’s	  fate	  could	  hinge	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  single	  word	  or	  another.	  	  	   In	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  majority	  opinion,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  begins	  the	  dissent	  by	  highlighting	  the	  gravitas	  of	  the	  legal	  question	  in	  Ledbetter.	  	  Relying	  on	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  plaintiff,	  the	  dissent	  begins,	  “Ledbetter	  was	  the	  only	  woman	  working	  as	  an	  area	  manager	  and	  the	  pay	  discrepancy	  between	  Ledbetter	  and	  her	  15	  male	  counterparts	  was	  stark:	  Ledbetter	  was	  paid	  $3,727	  per	  month;	  the	  lowest	  paid	  male	  area	  manager	  received	  $4,286	  per	  month,	  the	  highest	  paid,	  $5,236.”89	  By	  beginning	  with	  the	  injustice	  that	  has	  already	  occurred,	  Ginsburg	  frames	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  dissent’s	  opinion.	  While	  they	  will	  of	  course	  address	  the	  specific	  legal	  question	  before	  the	  Court,	  Ginsburg	  highlights	  in	  her	  opinion	  that	  there	  are	  issues	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  important	  social	  values	  at	  stake.	  	  	   This	  defining	  element	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  majority	  is	  the	  need	  to	  prove	  discriminatory	  intent	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  employer.	  Ledbetter	  is	  a	  disparate	  treatment	  claim,	  and	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  therefore	  required	  by	  the	  language	  of	  Title	  VII	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  employer	  acted	  with	  discriminatory	  intent	  in	  the	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  Pet.	  for	  Cert.	  i.	  550	  U.S.	  618	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  89	  Ledbetter	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specific	  employment	  practice	  at	  issue.	  Ledbetter	  argued	  “[T]he	  paychecks	  were	  unlawful	  because	  they	  would	  have	  been	  larger	  if	  she	  had	  been	  evaluated	  in	  a	  nondiscriminatory	  manner	  prior	  to	  the	  EEOC	  charging	  period.”90	  	  Similarly,	  a	  specific	  denial	  for	  a	  raise	  in	  1998	  was	  “unlawful	  because	  it	  ‘carried	  forward’	  the	  effects	  of	  prior,	  uncharged	  discrimination	  decisions.”91	  	  The	  Court	  attacks	  this	  rationale	  as	  insufficient,	  arguing	  that	  discriminatory	  acts	  that	  occurred	  prior	  to	  the	  charging	  period	  that	  had	  continuing	  effects	  during	  the	  charging	  period	  do	  not	  fulfill	  the	  burden	  that	  Title	  VII	  has	  outlined	  for	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  cases	  of	  disparate	  treatment.	  Alito	  writes:	  “[T]his	  argument	  is	  squarely	  foreclosed	  by	  our	  precedents.”92	  	  	   The	  dissent	  points	  out	  that	  the	  majority’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  statute	  would	  place	  the	  burden	  on	  Ledbetter	  to	  file	  charges	  year-­‐by-­‐year,	  each	  time	  Goodyear	  failed	  to	  increase	  her	  salary	  to	  match	  her	  male	  counterparts.	  “The	  Court’s	  insistence	  on	  immediate	  context	  overlooks	  common	  characteristics	  of	  pay	  discrimination.”93	  These	  common	  characteristics	  include	  the	  small,	  incremental	  development	  of	  pay	  disparity	  that	  occurs	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  the	  oftentimes	  hidden	  nature	  of	  pay	  information	  among	  employers.	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  pay	  disparity,	  the	  Court	  is	  often	  faced	  with	  plaintiffs	  who	  are	  in	  a	  nontraditional	  environment,	  and	  these	  individuals	  are	  especially	  reluctant	  to	  ask	  for	  comparative	  pay	  information.	  She	  considers	  “both	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decisions	  and	  the	  actual	  payment	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  5	  91	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  Pet’rs	  Br.	  5	  92	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  5	  93	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  1	  (Ginsburg,	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wage”94	  as	  unlawful	  practices	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Title	  VII.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  describes	  each	  individual	  paycheck	  as	  individual	  actions	  “infected	  by	  sex-­‐based	  discrimination”95,	  and	  that	  the	  prior	  pay-­‐setting	  decisions	  are	  not	  themselves	  actionable,	  but	  certainly	  relevant	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  unlawful	  practices	  occurred	  during	  the	  charging	  period.	  The	  dissent	  passionately	  states	  that	  this	  interpretation	  of	  sex-­‐based	  pay	  discrimination	  in	  relation	  to	  Title	  VII	  is	  “more	  faithful	  to	  precedent,	  more	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  workplace,	  and	  more	  respectful	  of	  Title	  VII’s	  remedial	  purpose.”96	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  4	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  95	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  4	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  96	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Chapter	  3:	  A	  Matter	  of	  Precedent	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  discussed	  how	  Justice	  Alito	  and	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  frame,	  understand,	  and	  argue	  Ledbetter	  differently.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  majority	  and	  dissenting	  opinions	  specifically	  understand	  the	  application	  of	  precedent	  case	  law	  in	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  question	  before	  them.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  while	  Ledbetter	  v.	  
Goodyear	  certainly	  raised	  questions	  about	  the	  philosophies	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  rare	  case	  of	  a	  Justice	  providing	  explicit,	  remedial	  instructions	  for	  Congress	  from	  the	  bench.	  In	  examining	  these	  arguments	  closely,	  we	  can	  more	  fully	  understand	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  blueprint	  for	  Congress.	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  dissent	  loudly	  calling	  for	  an	  interpretation	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  realities	  of	  workplace	  discrimination,	  but	  also	  it	  calls	  and	  arms	  Congress	  with	  a	  legal	  framework	  with	  which	  to	  amend	  and	  clarify	  Title	  VII’s	  language.	  In	  the	  following	  cases,	  Justice	  Alito	  will	  bring	  precedent	  case	  law	  from	  cases	  involving	  termination	  or	  refusal	  to	  hire	  in	  gender	  and	  race	  discrimination	  Title	  VII	  claims.	  Each	  and	  every	  time	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  will	  advocate	  that	  pay	  discrimination	  that	  Ledbetter	  experienced	  must	  be	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recognized	  as	  a	  form	  of	  Title	  VII	  discrimination.	  Indeed,	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  concretely	  instructs	  Congress	  to	  rewrite	  the	  law.	  	  	  United	  Air	  Lines	  v.	  Evans	  	   The	  first	  case	  cited	  by	  the	  majority	  is	  United	  Air	  Lines,	  Inc.	  v.	  Evans97,	  in	  which	  the	  court	  rejected	  an	  argument	  that	  was	  fundamentally	  the	  same	  as	  Ledbetter’s.	  In	  Evans,	  a	  female	  flight	  attendant	  was	  fired	  in	  1968	  because	  the	  airline	  had	  an	  unlawful	  policy	  of	  discrimination	  against	  married	  female	  flight	  attendants.	  While	  the	  Court	  agreed	  that	  this	  policy	  was	  certainly	  unlawful	  under	  Title	  VII,	  United	  Air	  Lines	  could	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  this	  discharge	  because	  the	  employee,	  Evans,	  did	  not	  file	  a	  claim	  with	  the	  EEOC	  within	  the	  180-­‐day	  charging	  period.	  The	  relevant	  question	  in	  Evans	  arose	  when	  Evans	  was	  rehired	  by	  the	  airline	  in	  1972,	  and	  was	  treated	  as	  a	  new	  employee	  under	  a	  seniority	  system.	  Evans	  sued	  because	  she	  was	  suffering	  pay	  cuts	  and	  benefit	  shorts	  as	  a	  “new	  employee”	  under	  this	  system,	  arguing	  that	  “while	  any	  suit	  based	  on	  the	  original	  discrimination	  was	  time	  barred,	  the	  airline’s	  refusal	  to	  give	  her	  credit	  for	  her	  prior	  service	  gave	  present	  effect	  to	  [its]	  past	  illegal	  act	  and	  thereby	  perpetuated	  the	  consequences	  of	  forbidden	  discrimination.”98	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Evans,	  431	  U.S.	  553	  (1977)	  98	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  6	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For	  the	  Court,	  the	  critical	  question	  in	  Evans	  was	  “whether	  any	  present	  violation	  existed.”99	  Justice	  Stevens	  wrote	  for	  the	  Court,	  “United	  was	  entitled	  to	  treat	  [Evans’	  termination]	  as	  lawful	  after	  respondent	  failed	  to	  file	  a	  charge	  of	  discrimination”	  within	  the	  required	  charging	  period.	  Further,	  Stevens	  wrote	  that	  “a	  discriminatory	  act	  which	  is	  not	  made	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  timely	  charge…	  is	  merely	  an	  unfortunate	  event	  in	  history	  which	  has	  no	  present	  legal	  consequences.”100	  Alito	  equates	  the	  question	  and	  diagnosis	  in	  Evans	  to	  be	  perfectly	  parallel	  to	  the	  question	  in	  Ledbetter,	  and	  writes,	  “It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  point	  more	  directly.”101	  	  	   Justice	  Ginsburg	  dismisses	  the	  Court’s	  reading	  of	  Evans	  in	  its	  entirety.	  The	  dissent	  understands	  Evans	  and	  Ledbetter	  to	  have	  distinguishable	  facts	  and	  circumstances,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  question	  at	  issue	  in	  Evans	  was	  notably	  different	  from	  the	  question	  at	  issue	  before	  the	  Court	  in	  Ledbetter	  because	  the	  present	  question	  involves	  pay.	  Ginsburg	  argued	  that	  pay	  disparities	  like	  Ledbetter’s	  are	  markedly	  different	  from	  a	  case	  involving	  promotions	  and	  seniority	  systems	  like	  Evans	  because	  those	  systems	  involve	  other	  employees,	  who	  would	  stand	  to	  benefit	  from	  Evans	  remaining	  at	  a	  junior	  position.	  In	  Ledbetter,	  and	  in	  all	  disparate	  pay	  cases,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  the	  discrimination	  “can	  be	  remedied	  at	  any	  time	  solely	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  employer	  who	  acts	  in	  a	  discriminatory	  fashion.”102	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   Further,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argued	  that	  Evans	  involved	  a	  single,	  immediately	  distinguishable	  act	  of	  discrimination:	  the	  termination	  of	  Evans’s	  employment.	  Ginsburg	  agrees	  that	  Evans	  should	  be	  held	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  discrete	  unlawful	  acts,	  and	  that	  she	  was	  rightfully	  constrained	  by	  the	  charging	  periods.	  However,	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  Evans	  and	  Ledbetter	  are	  incomparable.	  Because	  Ledbetter	  did	  not	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  clearly	  communicated	  discrimination	  that	  Evans	  had,	  she	  cannot	  be	  held	  to	  the	  same	  standard.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wholly	  unreasonable	  to	  place	  the	  onus	  on	  employees	  to	  bring	  a	  charge	  of	  discrimination	  in	  pay	  when	  they	  are	  oftentimes	  unaware	  of	  how	  their	  pay	  compares	  to	  the	  pay	  of	  their	  co-­‐workers.	  While	  Evans	  could	  not	  argue	  that	  she	  was	  unaware	  that	  she	  was	  being	  fired,	  Ledbetter	  could	  certainly	  argue	  that	  she	  was	  simply	  unaware	  that	  she	  was	  being	  paid	  less	  than	  her	  male	  counterparts.	  This	  argument,	  for	  Ginsburg,	  makes	  issues	  of	  pay	  disparity	  categorically	  different	  from	  other	  discrete	  discriminatory	  acts	  because	  pay	  disparities	  cannot	  always	  be	  perceived,	  and	  are	  often	  deliberately	  made	  secret	  by	  employers.	  While	  the	  majority	  does	  not	  take	  this	  into	  consideration,	  Ginsburg	  furthers	  her	  argument	  that	  Title	  VII	  was	  intended	  to	  protect	  employees	  against	  discrimination,	  and	  not	  to	  protect	  employers	  from	  employees.	  	  	  Delaware	  State	  College	  v.	  Ricks	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   Next,	  Alito	  cites	  another	  precedent	  that	  he	  believes	  is	  instructive	  in	  
Ledbetter.	  Delaware	  State	  College	  v.	  Ricks103	  concerned	  a	  college	  professor	  who	  alleged	  that	  he	  had	  been	  discharged	  because	  of	  his	  race.	  Ricks	  was	  denied	  tenure	  in	  June	  1974,	  but	  was	  then	  given	  a	  final,	  one-­‐year	  non-­‐renewable	  contract	  on	  June	  30,	  1975.	  Ricks	  filed	  a	  claim	  with	  the	  EEOC	  when	  his	  contract	  ended	  after	  his	  actual	  termination	  in	  April	  of	  1976.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Court	  argued	  that	  Ricks	  failed	  to	  identify	  any	  specific	  discriminatory	  intent	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  college	  between	  the	  time	  he	  was	  denied	  tenure	  and	  his	  termination.	  Because	  the	  denial	  of	  tenure	  was	  the	  only	  specific	  discriminatory	  act	  that	  Ricks	  could	  identify,	  the	  Court	  decided	  that	  the	  EEOC	  charging	  period	  began	  at	  “the	  time	  the	  tenure	  decision	  was	  made	  and	  communicated	  to	  Ricks.”104	  	  Alito	  also	  argues	  that	  in	  Ricks,	  the	  alleged	  discriminatory	  intent	  of	  the	  college	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  tenure	  could	  not	  be	  then	  attached	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  employment	  years	  later.	  The	  Court	  states	  that	  agreeing	  with	  Ledbetter	  would	  not	  only	  overrule	  the	  sound	  legal	  arguments	  in	  these	  precedent	  cases,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  “distort	  Title	  VII’s	  ‘integrated,	  multistep	  enforcement	  procedure.’”105	  In	  Ricks,	  the	  Court	  explained,	  “The	  EEOC	  filing	  deadlines	  ‘protect[s]	  employers	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  defending	  claims	  arising	  from	  employment	  decisions	  that	  are	  long	  past.’”106	  Because	  Ricks	  was	  unable	  to	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point	  to	  any	  specific	  instance	  of	  discriminatory	  treatment	  during	  the	  charging	  period,	  he	  was	  not	  allowed	  relief.	  Justice	  Alito	  uses	  the	  Court’s	  previous	  argument	  that	  Title	  VII	  does,	  in	  part,	  protect	  employers	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  reasoning	  should	  be	  instructive	  in	  Ledbetter.	  	  To	  the	  Court’s	  argument	  in	  Ricks,	  Ginsburg	  responds	  just	  as	  she	  did	  for	  Evans.	  Both	  cases	  involved	  single,	  obvious,	  and	  intentionally	  discriminatory	  acts.	  Mrs.	  Evans	  was	  fired	  for	  being	  married,	  and	  Professor	  Ricks	  was	  denied	  tenure	  for	  being	  black.	  While	  these	  acts	  are	  undeniably	  discriminatory,	  both	  of	  these	  plaintiffs	  are	  responsible	  for	  failing	  to	  bring	  suit	  within	  the	  allotted	  charging	  period.	  Once	  again,	  Ginsburg	  understands	  these	  facts	  to	  be	  distinguishable	  from	  those	  presented	  in	  Ledbetter	  and	  the	  question	  at	  hand.	  Ledbetter	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  held	  to	  the	  same	  standard	  as	  Evans	  and	  Ricks	  because	  pay	  discrimination	  is	  not	  comparable	  to	  discrimination	  in	  the	  form	  of	  refusal	  of	  tenure	  or	  termination	  of	  employment.	  	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  because	  of	  these	  realities	  of	  pay	  discrimination,	  
Ledbetter	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  cases	  involving	  termination,	  failure	  to	  promote,	  or	  refusal	  to	  hire.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  properly	  notified	  of	  the	  discrimination	  simply	  because	  of	  the	  type	  of	  notification	  that	  is	  required.	  Pay	  discrimination	  cases	  are	  inherently	  different	  because	  they	  often	  do	  not	  involve	  fully	  communicated	  discrete	  acts	  that	  are	  “easy	  to	  identify”107	  as	  discriminatory.	  In	  most	  cases	  of	  pay	  disparity,	  the	  employee	  is	  not	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  discrimination	  until	  “the	  disparity	  becomes	  apparent	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and	  sizeable.”108	  In	  Ledbetter,	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  only	  had	  knowledge	  and	  cause	  to	  sue	  after	  she	  calculated	  “future	  raises…as	  a	  percentage	  of	  current	  salaries.”109	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  the	  norm	  for	  employees	  to	  give	  employers	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  “should	  not	  preclude	  [Ledbetter]	  from	  later	  challenging	  the	  then	  current	  and	  continuing	  payment	  of	  a	  wage	  depressed	  on	  account	  of	  sex.”110	  	  	  Lorance	  v.	  AT&T	  	  	   Similarly,	  in	  Lorance	  v.	  AT&T	  Technologies	  Inc.111,	  the	  question	  of	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure	  was	  raised.	  At	  an	  AT&T	  plant,	  seniority	  designated	  raises,	  benefits,	  and	  safety	  from	  lay-­‐offs.	  Before	  1979,	  all	  employees	  in	  the	  plant	  were	  given	  seniority	  based	  on	  total	  years	  working	  at	  the	  plant.	  In	  1979,	  a	  new	  agreement	  was	  made	  that	  “testers”	  at	  the	  plant	  would	  be	  given	  seniority	  based	  on	  years	  working	  at	  that	  position	  versus	  years	  working	  at	  the	  plant	  overall.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  the	  “testers”	  were	  a	  higher-­‐paying	  mostly	  male	  dominated	  job.	  When	  the	  plant	  had	  to	  enforce	  lay-­‐offs	  several	  years	  later,	  female	  testers	  were	  the	  first	  to	  be	  laid	  off	  due	  to	  low	  seniority	  as	  calculated	  under	  the	  new	  1979	  “tester”	  provision.	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The	  female	  testers	  filed	  suit	  with	  the	  EEOC,	  alleging	  that	  this	  scheme	  was	  adopted	  with	  discriminatory	  intent	  to	  protect	  incumbent	  male	  testers	  from	  women	  who	  wanted	  the	  same	  job.	  In	  Lorance,	  Alito	  highlights	  the	  Court’s	  previous	  opinion	  that	  “the	  EEOC	  charging	  period	  ran	  from	  the	  time	  when	  the	  discrete	  act	  of	  illegal	  intentional	  discrimination	  occurred,	  not	  from	  the	  date	  when	  the	  effects	  of	  his	  practice	  were	  felt.”112	  Because	  the	  plaintiffs’	  claim	  alleges	  that	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  new	  “tester”	  provision	  of	  the	  seniority	  system	  is	  the	  discrete	  act	  of	  discrimination	  against	  female	  testers,	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  signing	  that	  triggers	  the	  limitations	  period.	  	  	   With	  regard	  to	  Lorance,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  against	  the	  majority’s	  use	  of	  this	  precedent	  because	  “it	  too	  involved	  a	  one-­‐time	  discrete	  act:	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  seniority	  system	  that	  ‘has	  its	  genesis	  in	  sex	  discrimination.’”113	  The	  workers	  in	  Lorance	  were	  obviously	  notified	  of	  the	  new	  seniority	  system,	  and	  therefore	  should	  have	  filed	  suit	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  Again,	  this	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  Ledbetter	  because	  she	  was	  never	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  discrimination	  against	  her.	  In	  addition,	  Ginsburg	  argues,	  “The	  Court’s	  extensive	  reliance	  on	  Lorance,	  ante,	  at	  7-­‐9,	  14,	  17-­‐18,	  moreover,	  is	  perplexing	  for	  that	  decision	  is	  no	  longer	  effective.”114	  In	  the	  1991	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  Congress	  superseded	  the	  holding	  in	  Lorance.	  While	  the	  women	  in	  
Lorance	  were	  not	  granted	  relief	  because	  they	  did	  not	  file	  their	  claim	  within	  the	  charging	  period,	  Congress	  provided	  in	  1991:	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  Ledbetter	  550	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  dissenting)	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  dissenting)	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   “For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  occurs…	  when	  the	  seniority	  system	  is	  adopted,	  when	  an	  individual	  becomes	  subject	  to	  the	  seniority	  system,	  or	  when	  a	  person	  aggrieved	  is	  injured	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  seniority	  system	  or	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  system.”115	  	  It	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991	  that	  Congress	  disagreed	  with	  the	  findings	  in	  Lorance,	  and	  that	  even	  if	  the	  Court	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  find	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  employer	  under	  Title	  VII,	  this	  was	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  lawmakers’	  intention,	  and	  the	  law’s	  remedial	  purpose.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  writes,	  “Congress	  never	  intended	  to	  immunize	  forever	  discriminatory	  pay	  differentials	  unchallenged	  within	  180	  days	  of	  their	  adoption.”116	  	  	   Congress	  overruled	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Lorance	  in	  1991	  with	  new	  legislation	  because	  the	  Court	  could	  not	  properly	  parse	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  law	  when	  deciding	  that	  case.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  the	  same	  does	  not	  apply	  for	  Ledbetter,	  as	  the	  Court	  can	  take	  the	  Lorance	  override	  as	  instruction.	  The	  dissent	  also	  argues:	  “A	  clue	  to	  congressional	  intent	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Title	  VII’s	  backpay	  provision.”117	  The	  backpay	  provision	  in	  Title	  VII	  requires	  that	  an	  employee	  receive	  backpay	  for	  up	  to	  two	  years	  in	  order	  for	  a	  discrimination	  charge	  to	  be	  filed.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  this	  provision	  indicates	  that	  Congress	  has	  acknowledged	  “challenges	  to	  pay	  discrimination	  commending	  before,	  but	  continuing	  into,	  the	  180-­‐day	  filing	  period.”	  (12).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  10	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  116	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  12	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  117	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  12	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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AMTRAK	  v.	  Morgan	  	  	   The	  final	  case	  that	  Alito	  references	  is	  also	  the	  most	  recent.	  National	  
Railroad	  Passenger	  Corporation	  v.	  Morgan118	  also	  considered	  a	  disparate	  treatment	  claim.	  Morgan	  was	  a	  black	  man	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  National	  Railroad	  Passenger	  Corporation,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  AMTRAK.	  He	  filed	  a	  complaint	  with	  the	  EEOC	  after	  working	  for	  the	  company	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  citing	  a	  hostile	  work	  environment	  in	  which	  he	  was	  subjected	  to	  racially	  discriminatory	  and	  retaliatory	  acts.	  The	  relevance	  in	  Morgan	  lies	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  “employment	  practice”	  asserted	  by	  the	  majority	  opinion.	  The	  Court	  explained	  in	  Morgan	  that	  “the	  statutory	  term	  ‘employment	  practice’	  generally	  refers	  to	  “a	  discrete	  act	  or	  single	  ‘occurrence’”	  that	  takes	  place	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  time.	  “Termination,	  failure	  to	  promote,	  denial	  of	  transfer,	  [and]	  refusal	  to	  hire”119	  are	  all	  cited	  by	  the	  Court	  as	  examples	  of	  possible	  discrete	  acts	  for	  which	  plaintiffs	  may	  sue,	  buy	  only	  if	  the	  discrete	  acts	  occurred	  within	  the	  appropriate	  time	  period.”120	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  Morgan	  could	  not	  charge	  AMTRAK	  with	  those	  individual	  acts	  of	  discrimination	  because	  they	  fell	  outside	  of	  the	  charging	  period.	  However	  because	  he	  was	  making	  a	  hostile	  work	  environment	  claim,	  he	  could	  use	  those	  previous	  individual	  acts	  to	  bolster	  his	  case	  as	  long	  as	  at	  least	  one	  subsequent	  discriminatory	  act	  happened	  within	  the	  charging	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Morgan	  536	  U.S.	  101	  119	  Morgan	  536	  U.S.	  101	  	  120	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  8	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The	  Court	  understands	  the	  opinion	  in	  Morgan	  to	  describe	  discrete	  acts	  of	  discrimination,	  as	  “an	  act	  that	  constitutes	  a	  separate	  actionable	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  that	  is	  temporarily	  distinct.”121	  Alternatively,	  
Morgan	  describes	  a	  hostile	  work	  environment	  as	  “a	  succession	  of	  harassing	  acts,	  each	  of	  which	  ‘may	  not	  be	  actionable	  on	  its	  own’	  and	  ‘cannot	  be	  said	  to	  occur	  on	  any	  particular	  day.’”122	  The	  majority	  contends	  that	  in	  Morgan,	  theactionable	  wrong	  is	  the	  environment,	  not	  individual	  actions	  that	  then	  create	  the	  environment.	  Because	  Ledbetter	  alleged	  a	  series	  of	  individual	  acts	  instead	  of	  a	  systematic	  wrong	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  succession	  of	  discriminatory	  acts,	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  find	  this	  argument	  sufficient.	  Justice	  Alito	  argues	  that	  because	  Ledbetter	  is	  not	  making	  a	  hostile	  work	  environment	  claim,	  she	  cannot	  use	  the	  same	  legal	  reasoning	  that	  allowed	  Morgan	  to	  cite	  previous	  instances	  of	  discrimination.	  	   Not	  surprisingly,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  Justice	  Alito’s	  reading	  of	  Morgan.	  She	  quotes	  the	  text,	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  “set	  apart,	  for	  purposes	  of	  Title	  VII’s	  timely	  filing	  requirement,	  unlawful	  employment	  actions	  of	  two	  kinds.”123	  Morgan	  established	  both	  “discrete	  acts”	  that	  are	  “easy	  to	  identify”	  as	  discriminatory,	  and	  acts	  that	  are	  recurring	  and	  cumulative	  in	  impact.	  Once	  again,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  asserts	  that	  pay	  discrimination	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  unlawful	  employment	  practices	  like	  termination,	  failure	  to	  promote,	  denial	  of	  transfer,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  122	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  123	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  5	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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or	  refusal	  to	  hire.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  discrete	  acts,	  the	  employee	  is	  obviously	  informed	  of	  the	  employer’s	  discrimination	  because	  the	  effects	  can	  be	  observed	  physically.	  To	  this	  end,	  pay	  discrimination,	  in	  which	  the	  employee	  often	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  gauge	  pay	  disparity,	  cannot	  be	  reviewed	  under	  the	  unlawful	  employment	  action	  of	  “discrete	  acts.”	  According	  to	  the	  dissent,	  Morgan	  supports	  their	  reading	  that	  Ledbetter	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  discrete	  discrimination	  because	  it	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  discrete	  acts	  that	  are	  listed.	  Therefore,	  Ledbetter	  and	  pay	  disparity	  cases	  like	  it	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  unlawful	  practices	  that	  are	  recurring	  and	  cumulative.	  In	  Morgan,	  the	  Court	  distinguished	  these	  acts	  “different	  in	  kind	  from	  discrete	  acts”	  because	  they	  are	  “based	  on	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  individual	  acts.”124	  The	  Court	  placed	  hostile	  work	  environment	  claims	  in	  this	  second	  category	  because	  “their	  very	  nature	  involves	  repeated	  conduct.”125	  In	  cases	  of	  hostile	  work	  environment,	  Title	  VII’s	  charging	  period	  rule	  is	  thus	  more	  flexible	  because	  some	  components	  of	  the	  unlawful	  action	  would	  certainly	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  charging	  period;	  such	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  recurring,	  cumulative	  unlawful	  employment	  practices.	  	  The	  dissent	  found	  that	  “pay	  disparities,	  of	  the	  kind	  Ledbetter	  experienced,	  have	  a	  closer	  kinship	  to	  hostile	  work	  environment	  claims	  than	  to	  charges	  of	  a	  single	  episode	  of	  discrimination.”126	  In	  response	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  5	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  125	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  6	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  126	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  6	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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majority’s	  assertion	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  sex	  discrimination	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discriminatory	  acts	  by	  individuals	  rather	  than	  a	  hostile	  work	  environment,	  Ginsburg	  responds	  that	  this	  is	  an	  unreasonable	  distinction.	  Alito	  writes	  that	  in	  Morgan,	  “the	  actionable	  wrong	  is	  the	  environment,	  not	  individual	  actions	  that	  then	  create	  the	  environment.”127	  Ginsburg	  dismisses	  this	  as	  an	  unrealistic	  understanding	  of	  a	  hostile	  workplace,	  as	  a	  hostile	  environment	  cannot	  exist	  without	  individual	  actions	  that	  create	  the	  environment.	  Like	  Ledbetter’s	  claim,	  Morgan	  rested	  not	  on	  one	  particular	  paycheck	  but	  on	  ‘”the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  individual	  acts.’”128	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  devotes	  a	  significant	  section	  of	  the	  dissent	  to	  criticize	  the	  majority’s	  opinion	  as	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  workplace	  discrimination.	  While	  the	  majority	  has	  categorized	  Ledbetter’s	  pay	  discrimination	  case	  as	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  to	  other	  cases	  of	  employment	  discrimination,	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  major	  difference	  between	  pay	  cases	  and	  other	  employment	  cases.	  Specifically,	  pay	  cases	  are	  different	  because	  they	  do	  not	  fit	  within	  the	  category	  of	  singular	  discrete	  acts	  easy	  to	  identify.	  As	  the	  Court	  notes	  in	  Morgan,	  a	  worker	  knows	  immediately	  “if	  she	  is	  denied	  a	  promotion	  or	  transfer,	  if	  she	  is	  fired	  or	  refused	  employment.”129	  These	  events	  are	  also	  generally	  known	  to	  co-­‐workers	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  public	  events.	  “Compensation	  disparities,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  often	  hidden	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  128	  Morgan	  536	  U.S.	  101,	  115	  129	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  7	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sight.”130	  The	  remedial	  purpose	  of	  Title	  VII,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues,	  was	  to	  protect	  employees	  from	  discrimination.	  In	  her	  view,	  the	  majority’s	  reading	  of	  
Morgan	  in	  this	  case	  focused	  on	  technical	  details,	  but	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  purpose	  and	  intent	  of	  Title	  VII.	  	  	  Bazemore	  v.	  Friday	  	  	   While	  all	  of	  the	  cases	  analyzed	  above	  were	  introduced	  by	  the	  majority	  and	  subsequently	  rejected	  by	  the	  dissent,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  relies	  heavily	  on	  another	  case,	  Bazemore	  v.	  Friday,131	  to	  make	  her	  argument.	  With	  regard	  to	  Ledbetter’s	  argument	  under	  Title	  VII,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  and	  the	  dissenters	  pose	  this	  legal	  question:	  “What	  constitutes	  an	  ‘unlawful	  employment	  practice’	  and	  when	  has	  that	  practice	  ‘occurred’?”132	  As	  in	  the	  petitioner’s	  brief,	  the	  dissent	  argues	  that	  according	  to	  precedent	  in	  Bazemore	  and	  rulings	  of	  lower	  courts,	  “the	  unlawful	  practice	  is	  the	  current	  payment	  of	  salaries	  infected	  by	  gender-­‐based	  discrimination	  –	  a	  practice	  that	  occurs	  whenever	  a	  paycheck	  delivers	  less	  to	  a	  woman	  than	  to	  a	  similarly	  situated	  man.”133	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  the	  Court	  must	  consider	  “what	  activity	  qualities	  as	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  in	  cases	  of	  discrimination	  with	  respect	  to	  compensation”134,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  answers.	  The	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  7	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  131	  Bazemore	  v.	  Friday,	  478	  U.S.	  385	  (1986)	  132	  Bazemore	  478	  U.S.	  385,	  110	  133	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  3	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  134	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  4	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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answer,	  which	  the	  majority	  has	  adopted,	  considers	  unlawful	  employment	  practices	  to	  be	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decision,	  and	  that	  decision	  alone,	  as	  the	  unlawful	  employment	  practice.	  The	  second	  answer,	  which	  the	  dissent	  asserts,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Court’s	  unanimous	  decision	  in	  Bazemore.	  This	  decision	  found	  that	  both	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decision	  and	  any	  subsequent	  affected	  paychecks	  are	  unlawful	  employment	  practices	  based	  upon	  the	  remedial	  purpose	  of	  Title	  VII.	  
Bazemore	  was	  also	  a	  disparate	  treatment	  pay	  claim,	  brought	  against	  the	  North	  Caroline	  Agricultural	  Extension	  Service.135	  Prior	  to	  1965,	  the	  Service	  had	  a	  “white	  branch”	  and	  a	  “Negro	  branch,”	  with	  the	  latter	  receiving	  significantly	  less	  pay.	  In	  1965,	  the	  two	  branches	  merged,	  but	  blacks	  were	  still	  receiving	  significantly	  less	  pay	  than	  whites	  in	  the	  Service.	  When	  Title	  VII	  was	  extended	  to	  public	  employees	  in	  1972,	  black	  members	  of	  the	  Service	  sued	  for	  equal	  compensation.	  Because	  of	  the	  history	  of	  discrimination	  against	  the	  “Negro	  branch”	  in	  the	  Service,	  “pre-­‐existing	  salary	  disparities	  continued	  to	  linger	  on”136	  after	  the	  branches	  were	  combined.	  The	  Court	  found	  in	  Bazemore	  that	  “each	  week’s	  paycheck	  that	  delivers	  less	  to	  a	  black	  than	  to	  a	  similarly	  situated	  white	  is	  a	  wrong	  actionable	  under	  Title	  VII.”137	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  this	  principle	  is	  wholly	  applicable	  to	  Ledbetter.	  Similarly,	  each	  week’s	  paycheck	  that	  delivers	  less	  to	  a	  woman	  than	  to	  a	  similarly	  situated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Bazemore	  478	  U.S.	  385,	  389-­‐390	  136	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  5	  137	  Bazemore	  478	  U.S.	  385,	  395	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man	  is	  a	  wrong	  actionable	  under	  Title	  VII.	  This	  reading,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues,	  is	  more	  faithful	  to	  precedent.	  	  For	  Ginsburg,	  Bazemore	  simply	  affirmed	  the	  argument	  that	  both	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decision	  and	  the	  actual	  payment	  of	  discriminatory	  wage	  are	  unlawful	  employment	  practices.	  Justice	  Alito	  argued	  in	  the	  majority	  opinion	  that	  Bazemore	  was	  not	  about	  allowing	  both	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decision	  and	  the	  subsequent	  paychecks	  to	  act	  as	  triggers.	  Instead,	  the	  majority	  understood	  
Bazemore	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  discriminatory	  pay	  structures.	  The	  majority	  understood	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  in	  Bazemore	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  facts	  in	  Ledbetter	  to	  disregard	  Ledbetter’s	  interpretation.	  Specifically,	  the	  Court	  argues	  that	  Bazemore	  dealt	  with	  a	  “facially	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure”138	  that	  explicitly	  places	  employees	  on	  a	  lower	  scale	  because	  of	  race,	  “which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  they	  had	  engaged	  in	  fresh	  discrimination.”139	  Alito	  argues	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Ledbetter,	  and	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  paycheck	  accrual	  rule	  disregards	  the	  heart	  of	  Brennan’s	  reasoning	  in	  Bazemore.	  Alito	  writes	  that	  “Ledbetter’s	  interpretation	  is	  unsound”140	  because	  it	  would	  dispense	  with	  the	  need	  to	  prove	  actual	  discriminatory	  intent	  with	  each	  unlawful	  employment	  practice.	  	  	  “Bazemore	  stands	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  an	  employer	  violates	  Title	  VII	  and	  triggers	  a	  new	  EEOC	  charging	  period	  whenever	  the	  employer	  issues	  paychecks	  using	  a	  discriminatory	  pay	  structure.	  But	  a	  new	  Title	  VII	  violation	  does	  not	  occur	  and	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  15	  139	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  16	  140	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  14	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new	  charging	  period	  is	  not	  triggered	  when	  an	  employer	  issues	  paychecks	  pursuant	  to	  a	  system	  that	  is	  ‘facially	  nondiscriminatory	  and	  neutrally	  applied.’”141	  	  In	  order	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  under	  the	  rule	  in	  Bazemore,	  the	  majority	  argues	  that	  Ledbetter	  must	  have	  adduced	  evidence	  that	  Goodyear	  adopted	  its	  performance-­‐based	  pay	  structure	  in	  order	  to	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex.	  Because	  Ledbetter	  argued	  that	  Goodyear	  agents	  discriminated	  against	  her	  individually,	  which	  then	  caused	  subsequent	  pay	  deductions,	  “Bazemore	  is	  of	  no	  help	  to	  her.”142	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  discuss	  how	  Alito’s	  interpretation	  of	  case	  law	  failed	  to	  properly	  analyze	  and	  use	  case	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  18	  142	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  18	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Chapter	  4:	  Majority	  Failure	  	  	  	   	  After	  dissecting	  the	  legal	  arguments,	  both	  the	  majority	  and	  dissenters	  finally	  consider	  how	  far	  interpretations	  should	  reach	  into	  policy	  issues	  like	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  Ledbetter	  case.	  The	  majority	  argues	  that	  they	  are	  bound	  by	  their	  duty	  to	  interpret	  the	  laws	  created	  by	  Congress,	  and	  that	  the	  dissent’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  extends	  into	  the	  unacceptable	  realm	  of	  policymaking.	  The	  dissent	  responds	  that	  they	  are	  not	  overstepping,	  but	  rather,	  they	  are	  appropriately	  weighing	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  decision	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  text	  and	  the	  law’s	  purpose.	  Justice	  Alito	  argues	  that	  even	  if	  Goodyear	  discriminated	  against	  Ledbetter	  because	  of	  her	  sex,	  the	  Court’s	  hands	  are	  tied	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  statute:	  “We	  have	  repeatedly	  rejected	  suggestion	  that	  we	  extend	  or	  truncate	  Congress’	  deadlines.”143	  	  According	  to	  the	  majority,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  charging	  limitations	  written	  into	  the	  statute	  reflects	  the	  intent	  of	  Congress,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  changed	  by	  the	  Court.	  Despite	  this,	  Alito	  agrees	  that	  the	  charging	  period	  is	  comparatively	  short,	  but	  reconciles	  this	  by	  explaining,	  “Congress	  clearly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  10	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intended	  to	  encourage	  the	  prompt	  processing	  of	  all	  charges	  of	  employment	  discrimination.”144	  The	  shortness	  of	  the	  deadline	  in	  Title	  VII	  suggests	  strong	  preferences	  in	  Congress	  for	  quick	  resolution,	  and	  the	  Court	  must	  enforce	  the	  law	  rather	  than	  rewrite	  it:	  “Ultimately,	  ‘experience	  teaches	  that	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  procedural	  requirements	  specified	  by	  the	  legislature	  is	  the	  best	  guarantee	  of	  evenhanded	  administration	  of	  the	  law.’”145	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  majority	  concluded	  that	  employment	  practices	  not	  explicitly	  discriminatory	  in	  each	  instance	  cannot	  be	  considered	  triggers	  for	  new	  charging	  periods,	  and	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  claim	  was	  untimely.	  	  	   Further,	  Alito	  responds	  to	  the	  Plaintiffs’	  policy	  claims	  that	  because	  pay	  discrimination	  is	  harder	  to	  detect	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination,	  plaintiffs	  should	  be	  given	  more	  time	  to	  respond.	  To	  this,	  the	  Court	  simply	  states	  that	  they	  are	  in	  no	  position	  to	  evaluate	  these	  arguments	  because	  these	  requests	  have	  no	  basis	  in	  the	  statute	  or	  in	  precedent.	  In	  a	  strictly	  textualist	  manner,	  Justice	  Alito	  ends	  by	  saying,	  “We	  apply	  the	  statute	  as	  written,	  and	  this	  means	  that	  any	  unlawful	  employment	  practice,	  including	  those	  involving	  compensation,	  must	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  EEOC	  within	  the	  period	  prescribed	  by	  the	  statute.”146	  	  	   The	  legal	  arguments	  in	  the	  majority	  opinion	  focus	  heavily	  on	  three	  points:	  precedent,	  fidelity	  to	  the	  text,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Court	  as	  an	  active	  policy	  maker.	  In	  response	  to	  Ledbetter’s	  arguments	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  pay	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  13	  145	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  13	  146	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  24	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claims	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  discrete	  act	  of	  discrimination	  necessary	  to	  trigger	  the	  charging	  period,	  Alito	  sees	  inconsistency	  with	  the	  relevant	  precedents	  involving	  other	  Title	  VII	  cases.	  For	  the	  majority,	  Ledbetter	  is	  bound	  inexplicably	  to	  Evans,	  Ricks,	  Lorance,	  and	  Morgan.	  In	  their	  view,	  the	  facts	  and	  questions	  in	  these	  cases	  are	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  and	  therefore	  must	  follow	  the	  rationale	  in	  previous	  rulings.	  Alito	  argues	  that	  the	  Court	  must	  remain	  faithful	  to	  Title	  VII’s	  language	  and	  resist	  broader	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text	  that	  constitutes	  policy.	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  broad	  remedial	  purpose	  of	  Title	  VII	  as	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  does	  in	  the	  dissent,	  Justice	  Alito	  insists	  upon	  strict,	  textualist	  statutory	  interpretation.	  For	  the	  majority,	  Title	  VII	  is	  not	  vague.	  Ledbetter	  did	  not	  fulfill	  her	  burden	  as	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  this	  case,	  and	  the	  Court	  cannot	  stray	  beyond	  the	  language	  of	  the	  law.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  reads	  the	  precedent	  cases	  differently	  because	  she	  believes	  that	  pay	  disparities	  are	  categorically	  different	  from	  the	  other	  forms	  of	  pay	  discrimination	  found	  in	  the	  majority’s	  precedents.	  In	  order	  to	  more	  robustly	  draw	  this	  distinction,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  management	  to	  refuse	  to	  publish	  employee	  pay	  levels.	  In	  Goodwin	  v.	  General	  Motors	  Corp.147,	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  know	  what	  her	  colleagues	  earned	  until	  a	  printout	  listing	  salaries	  at	  General	  Motors	  seven	  years	  after	  she	  began	  to	  work	  there.	  In	  McMillan	  v.	  Massachusetts	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Society	  for	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Cruelty	  to	  Animals,148	  the	  plaintiff	  worked	  for	  the	  employer	  for	  years	  before	  that	  a	  salary	  disparity	  existed.	  	  The	  same	  was	  found	  in	  Ledbetter,	  as	  Goodyear	  admitted	  that	  it	  kept	  salaries	  confidential	  from	  employees,	  and	  all	  employees	  had	  little	  to	  no	  access	  to	  the	  earnings	  of	  their	  colleagues.	  Ginsburg	  further	  argues	  that	  pay	  disparity	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  denial	  of	  raise	  because	  cases	  like	  Ledbetter’s	  do	  not	  concern	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  given	  a	  raise.	  Ledbetter	  was	  given	  raises	  throughout	  her	  time	  at	  Goodyear,	  but	  the	  important	  factor	  to	  consider	  is	  how	  much	  those	  raises	  were	  in	  comparison	  to	  her	  similarly	  situated	  male	  counterparts.	  The	  discovery	  of	  pay	  disparity	  takes	  time,	  and	  the	  employee	  may	  not	  notice	  the	  disparity	  until	  a	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  discrimination	  develops.	  Even	  then,	  the	  dissent	  notes	  that	  the	  discovery	  of	  significant	  pay	  disparity	  takes	  even	  more	  time,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  likely	  for	  a	  plaintiff	  to	  file	  suit	  if	  the	  disparity	  is	  significant	  enough	  and	  the	  employer’s	  discriminatory	  intent	  is	  pointed	  enough.	  	  Further,	  unlike	  refusal	  to	  promote,	  denial	  of	  transfer,	  and	  refusal	  to	  hire,	  the	  employer	  has	  something	  to	  gain	  by	  paying	  a	  woman	  less	  than	  her	  male	  counterpart.	  If	  an	  employer	  refuses	  to	  hire,	  promote,	  or	  transfer	  a	  woman	  because	  of	  her	  sex,	  they	  will	  still	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  man	  to	  take	  those	  positions	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  company	  goals.	  However,	  in	  cases	  of	  pay	  disparity,	  employers	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  keeping	  a	  woman	  in	  a	  company,	  promoting	  her,	  but	  choosing	  to	  pay	  her	  less	  than	  men	  in	  the	  same	  position.	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“When	  a	  woman	  is	  paid	  less	  than	  a	  similarly	  situated	  man,	  the	  employer	  reduces	  its	  costs	  each	  time	  the	  pay	  differential	  is	  implemented.”149	  	  	   Citing	  multiple	  cases	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  Appeals,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  in	  this	  case	  falls	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  interpretations	  of	  many	  other	  courts.	  In	  these	  cases,	  “a	  discriminatory	  salary	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  lingering	  effect	  of	  past	  discrimination	  –	  instead	  it	  is	  itself	  a	  continually	  recurring	  violation…”150	  The	  dissent	  points	  out	  that	  even	  the	  EEOC	  Compliance	  Manual	  provides	  that	  “repeated	  occurrences	  of	  the	  same	  discriminatory	  employment	  action,	  such	  as	  discriminatory	  paychecks,	  can	  be	  challenged	  as	  long	  as	  one	  discriminatory	  act	  occurred	  within	  the	  charge	  filing	  period.”151	  Time	  and	  time	  again,	  both	  the	  lower	  courts	  and	  the	  EEOC	  have	  supported	  the	  argument	  that	  both	  the	  pay-­‐setting	  decision	  and	  the	  actual	  payment	  of	  discriminatory	  wage	  may	  individually	  be	  considered	  unlawful	  employment	  practices.	  	  	   	  In	  the	  majority	  opinion,	  Justice	  Alito	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  limiting	  of	  the	  charging	  period	  is	  crucial	  to	  “protect	  employers	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  defending	  claims	  arising	  from	  employment	  decisions	  long	  past.”152	  To	  this	  point,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  first	  responds	  that	  Ledbetter’s	  discrimination	  was	  not	  long	  past;	  indeed,	  the	  pay	  discrimination	  she	  faced	  only	  grew	  with	  time.	  Furthermore,	  the	  dissent	  argues	  that	  employers	  would	  not	  be	  “left	  defenseless”	  against	  unreasonable	  delay	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  employee.	  The	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employer	  has	  various	  defenses	  from	  which	  to	  choose,	  ranging	  from	  waiver,	  estoppel,	  equitable	  tolling,	  to	  laches.	  Indignantly,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  also	  responds	  to	  Justice	  Alito’s	  assertion	  in	  the	  majority	  opinion	  that	  her	  reasoning	  would	  allow	  a	  plaintiff	  to	  sue	  on	  a	  single	  decision	  “made	  20	  years	  ago	  ‘even	  if	  the	  employee	  had	  full	  knowledge	  of	  all	  the	  circumstances	  relating	  to	  the	  decision	  at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  made.’”153	  Ginsburg	  calls	  this	  hypothetical	  “fool-­‐hardy”	  and	  “a	  last-­‐ditch	  argument.”154	  	  	   Justice	  Ginsburg	  spends	  the	  last	  few	  pages	  of	  the	  dissent	  rejecting	  the	  majority’s	  dismissal	  of	  “policy	  issues.”	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  law	  is	  simple:	  to	  protect	  employees	  from	  discrimination.	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  law	  is	  not	  a	  policy	  issue.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  framework	  under	  which	  proper	  statutory	  interpretation	  can	  be	  achieved.	  The	  parsing	  of	  intentional	  versus	  unintentional	  structure,	  discrete	  versus	  compounding	  discriminatory	  acts	  are	  all,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  irrelevant	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  law’s	  purpose.	  Ginsburg	  argues	  that	  the	  majority	  has	  lost	  sight	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  Title	  VII	  by	  focusing	  too	  narrowly	  on	  text	  of	  Title	  VII.	  Under	  this	  literalist	  reading,	  “Knowingly	  carrying	  past	  pay	  discrimination	  forward	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  lawful	  conduct.”155	  Ginsburg	  passionately	  dissents,	  arguing	  that	  Ledbetter	  has	  met	  her	  burden	  wholly.	  “The	  Court’s	  approbation	  of	  these	  consequences	  is	  totally	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  robust	  protection	  against	  workplace	  discrimination	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Congress	  intended	  Title	  VII	  to	  secure.”156	  The	  dissent	  calls	  the	  Court’s	  opinion	  in	  Ledbetter	  “a	  cramped	  interpretation	  of	  Title	  VII,	  incompatible	  with	  the	  statute’s	  broad	  remedial	  measures.”157	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  ends	  by	  calling	  on	  Congress	  to	  act	  to	  “correct	  this	  Court’s	  parsimonious	  reading	  of	  Title	  VII,”	  just	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Lorance	  and	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991.	  	  	   Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  arguments	  in	  this	  dissent	  would	  eventually	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Act	  of	  2009.	  This	  dissenting	  opinion	  is	  among	  the	  most	  famous	  written	  by	  Ginsburg,	  and	  she	  took	  the	  unorthodox	  path	  of	  reading	  the	  dissent	  aloud	  from	  the	  bench	  when	  the	  Ledbetter	  opinion	  was	  handed	  down.	  The	  fervent	  disagreement	  expressed	  by	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  in	  this	  opinion	  goes	  beyond	  the	  nuanced	  question	  of	  time	  limitations	  were	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  majority.	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  addresses	  both	  these	  smaller	  legal	  technicalities	  as	  well	  as	  a	  larger	  question	  about	  consequences	  of	  the	  Court’s	  decision.	  The	  latter	  argument	  caught	  fire,	  spurring	  Congress	  to	  action.	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  for	  the	  dissent,	  the	  majority’s	  use	  of	  precedent	  is	  entirely	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  issue	  presented	  by	  Ledbetter.	  Not	  only	  does	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  argue	  that	  the	  majority’s	  interpretation	  of	  Title	  VII	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  law’s	  purpose,	  she	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  intended	  application	  of	  the	  law.	  This,	  she	  acknowledges,	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  only	  Congress	  can	  remedy.	  As	  a	  woman	  who	  graduated	  from	  Columbia	  Law	  School	  during	  a	  time	  when	  women	  didn’t	  get	  law	  degrees,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  cut	  her	  teeth	  by	  litigating	  many	  famous	  gender	  rights	  cases	  for	  the	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	  157	  Ledbetter	  550	  U.S.	  618,	  19	  (Ginsburg,	  J.	  dissenting)	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Civil	  Liberties	  Union	  Women’s	  Rights	  Project.158	  As	  counsel	  of	  record	  for	  multiple	  landmark	  gender	  rights	  Supreme	  Court	  cases	  like	  Reed	  v.	  Reed159	  and	  Frontiero	  v.	  Richardson160,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  not	  only	  formulated	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  supporting	  gender	  rights	  issues,	  but	  she	  also	  understood	  how	  advocacy	  could	  affect	  Congress.	  Ginsburg’s	  background	  and	  expertise	  prepared	  her	  to	  both	  fully	  understand	  the	  issues	  present	  in	  Ledbetter,	  and	  write	  a	  powerful	  dissenting	  opinion	  that	  successfully	  countered	  the	  majority’s	  arguments,	  and	  provided	  lawmakers	  with	  a	  blueprint	  for	  remedial	  action.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Tribute:	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Ruth	  Bader	  Ginsburg	  and	  the	  WRP	  Staff,	  ACLU.org	  159	  Reed	  v.	  Reed,	  404	  U.S.	  71	  (1971)	  160	  Frontiero	  v.	  Richardson,	  411	  U.S.	  677	  (1973)	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Chapter	  5:	  The	  Ball	  in	  Congress’s	  Court	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Ledbetter	  decision	  is	  significant	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Indeed,	  only	  in	  July	  of	  2007,	  just	  two	  months	  after	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  opinion	  was	  handed	  down,	  lawmakers	  attempted	  to	  pass	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007.161	  This	  act	  would	  amend	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  to	  abolish	  the	  time	  restrictions	  in	  Title	  VII,	  and	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  decision	  made	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear.	  Congressional	  overrides	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  rare,	  making	  the	  journey	  from	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  to	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009	  a	  unique	  one.	  	  	   The	  literature	  on	  the	  cause	  of	  congressional	  overrides	  is	  limited,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  best-­‐known	  studies	  are	  dedicated	  to	  empirical	  analysis	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  study	  of	  particular	  case.	  	  Professor	  William	  Eskridge	  published	  a	  landmark	  study	  in	  1991	  in	  which	  he	  analyzed	  the	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  congressional	  overrides	  over	  a	  twenty-­‐three	  year	  period	  and	  developed	  a	  theoretical	  model	  to	  understand	  “the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Court,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  “H.R.2831	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007,”	  Congress.gov,	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Congress,	  and	  the	  President.”	  162	  In	  2012,	  Eskridge	  and	  Matthew	  R.	  Christensen	  updated	  the	  original	  study	  and	  included	  the	  Ledbetter	  case	  in	  the	  data	  of	  congressional	  overrides	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  statutory	  interpretation	  decisions.163	  More	  recently,	  another	  scholar,	  Richard	  L.	  Hasen,	  published	  his	  own	  empirical	  study	  that	  criticized	  the	  Eskridge	  and	  Christensen	  findings	  and	  proposed	  a	  new	  theory	  for	  understanding	  congressional	  overrides.[FOOTNOTE	  NEEDED	  FOR	  THIS	  ARTICLE].	  	   While	  Eskridge,	  Christensen,	  and	  Hasen	  compiled	  data	  on	  why	  congressional	  overrides	  occur,	  this	  thesis	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
Ledbetter	  congressional	  override.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Martha	  Chamallas’s	  article,	  “Ledbetter,	  Gender	  Equity	  and	  Institutional	  Context”164	  is	  most	  relevant.	  Unlike	  Eskridge,	  Christensen,	  and	  Hazen,	  Chamallas	  looks	  at	  Ledbetter	  individually	  as	  both	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  and	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation.	  Her	  findings	  center	  around	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent,	  and	  her	  “trademark	  approach	  to	  gender	  equality	  in	  the	  workplace.”165	  She	  argues	  that	  what	  makes	  Ledbetter	  unique	  is	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  opinion,	  as	  it	  displays	  “sensitivity	  for	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  employment	  and	  other	  types	  of	  decisions	  are	  made,”	  and	  “an	  equally	  deep	  appreciation	  for	  how	  legal	  doctrine	  is	  likely	  to	  translate	  into	  norms	  and	  practices	  in	  real-­‐world	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Eskridge,	  William	  N.	  Jr.,	  "Overriding	  Supreme	  Court	  Statutory	  Interpretation	  Decisions"	  (1991).	  Faculty	  Scholarship	  Series.	  Paper	  3836.	  163	  Eskridge,	  William	  N.	  Congressional	  Overrides	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  Statutory	  
Interpretation	  Decisions,	  1967-­‐2011.	  Yale	  Law	  Journal.	  Vol.	  92:1317.	  2012.	  164	  Chamallas,	  Martha.	  Ledbetter,	  Gender	  Equity	  and	  Institutional	  Context.	  Ohio	  State	  Law	  Journal.	  Vol.	  70:4.	  2009.	  165	  Chamallas,	  1038.	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settings.”166	  Chamallas’	  conclusion	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  legal	  analysis	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  	  	   Justice	  Ginsburg	  accurately	  predicted	  Congress’s	  next	  move	  when	  she	  made	  reference	  to	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991167.	  Indeed,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  the	  Ledbetter	  Act	  contains	  the	  exact	  language	  of	  her	  dissenting	  opinion.	  In	  1991,	  Congress	  and	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  passed	  the	  first	  law	  since	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  that	  addressed	  and	  modified	  conditions	  for	  employees	  who	  sued	  their	  employers	  for	  discrimination.168	  The	  provisions	  in	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1991	  acted	  as	  overrides	  for	  the	  decisions	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  these	  cases,	  among	  others.	  	  	   In	  Ledbetter,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  found	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  duty	  of	  Congress	  in	  2007	  and	  the	  duty	  that	  Congress	  took	  up	  in	  1991.	  In	  her	  dissent,	  she	  not	  only	  foresaw	  the	  role	  her	  dissent	  might	  play	  in	  Congress,	  but	  she	  also	  included	  precise	  statutory	  language	  that	  Congress	  would	  later	  actually	  write	  into	  the	  bill.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  was	  both	  confident	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  her	  argument,	  and	  also	  confident	  that	  her	  arguments	  would	  be	  instructive	  to	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  Chamallas	  writes,	  “Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  presented	  a	  cogent	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  legal	  precedents,	  ably	  countering	  the	  majority’s	  contention	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  was	  compelled	  by	  statutory	  language...”169	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Chamallas,	  1038.	  167	  Pub.	  L.	  102-­‐166	  168	  Pub.	  L.	  102-­‐166	  169	  Chamallas,	  1042.	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The	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007,	  brought	  to	  the	  House	  floor	  by	  Democrats,	  made	  it	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  with	  93	  co-­‐sponsors,	  all	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Party.	  The	  final	  vote	  in	  the	  House	  was	  225	  yeas	  to	  199	  nays.	  The	  clearly	  partisan	  nature	  of	  the	  bill	  at	  this	  time	  became	  even	  more	  evident	  as	  the	  bill	  moved	  to	  the	  Senate,	  where	  it	  failed	  to	  pass.170	  But,	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  bill	  persisted,	  and	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009	  came	  before	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  during	  the	  111th	  Congress	  in	  January	  of	  2009.171	  Upon	  reaching	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  once	  again,	  the	  bill	  passed	  with	  250	  members	  in	  support	  and	  177	  opposed.172	  The	  bill	  reached	  the	  Senate,	  passing	  with	  a	  narrow	  margin.	  This	  time	  61	  supported	  the	  bill	  while	  36	  opposed	  it,	  and	  Senator	  Ted	  Kennedy	  of	  Massachusetts,	  a	  staunch	  supporter,	  did	  not	  vote	  due	  to	  his	  ailing	  health.173	  The	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  finally	  passed	  in	  2009	  to	  protect	  Title	  VII’s	  broad	  remedial	  purpose,	  just	  as	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  had	  instructed	  Congress	  to	  do	  in	  her	  dissent.	  	   The	  text	  of	  the	  Ledbetter	  Act	  of	  2009	  is	  short.	  Spanning	  only	  three	  pages,	  this	  Act	  focuses	  narrowly	  on	  the	  filing	  period.	  The	  preamble	  of	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009	  states	  that	  the	  Act	  is	  meant	  “to	  amend	  title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964…[and]	  to	  clarify	  that	  a	  discriminatory	  compensation	  decision	  or	  other	  practice	  that	  is	  unlawful	  under	  such	  Acts	  occurs	  each	  time	  compensation	  is	  paid	  pursuant	  to	  the	  discriminatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  “H.R.2831	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2007,”	  Congress.gov	  171	  “S.181	  -­‐	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,”	  Congress.gov	  	  172	  S.181	  –	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  Senate	  Vote	  Roll	  	  173	  S.181	  –	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  Senate	  Vote	  Roll	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compensation	  decision…”174	  Lawmakers	  specifically	  address	  the	  Court	  in	  their	  findings,	  which	  state,	  “The	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Ledbetter	  v.	  Goodyear	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Co.,	  550	  U.S.	  618	  (2007),	  significantly	  impairs	  statutory	  protections	  against	  discrimination	  in	  compensation…”175	  Moreover,	  Congress	  replicates	  the	  exact	  language	  of	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  when	  they	  conclude,	  “The	  limitation	  imposed	  by	  the	  Court	  on	  the	  filing	  of	  discriminatory	  compensation	  claims	  ignores	  the	  reality	  of	  wage	  discrimination	  and	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  robust	  application	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  law	  that	  Congress	  intended.”176	  Congress	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  call	  these	  principles	  of	  equal	  compensation	  “the	  bedrock	  principles	  of	  American	  law	  for	  decades.”177	  	  	   As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  principal	  disagreement	  between	  Justice	  Alito’s	  majority	  and	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  concerned	  the	  definition	  of	  “unlawful	  employment	  practice”	  as	  it	  triggers	  the	  charging	  period.	  To	  this	  end,	  Congress	  writes	  in	  2009,	  	  “Section	  706(e)	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  is	  amended	  by	  adding	  at	  the	  end	  the	  following:	  ‘(3)(A)	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  an	  unlawful	  employment	  practice	  occurs,	  with	  respect	  to	  discrimination	  in	  compensation	  in	  violation	  of	  this	  title,	  when	  a	  discriminatory	  compensation	  decisions	  or	  other	  practice	  is	  adopted,	  when	  an	  individual	  becomes	  subject	  to	  a	  discriminatory	  compensation	  decision	  or	  other	  practice,	  or	  when	  an	  individual	  is	  affected	  by	  application	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  compensation	  decision	  or	  other	  practice,	  including	  each	  time	  wages,	  benefits,	  or	  other	  compensation	  is	  paid,	  resulting	  in	  while	  or	  in	  part	  from	  such	  a	  decision	  or	  any	  other	  practice.’”178	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  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  argument	  that	  compensation	  deserved	  its	  own	  specific	  definition,	  separate	  from	  other	  types	  of	  workplace	  discrimination,	  is	  included	  in	  this	  amendment,	  and	  quoted	  almost	  word	  for	  word.	  Congress	  acknowledges	  “discrimination	  in	  compensation”	  as	  a	  form	  of	  discrimination	  that	  deserves	  and	  demands	  its	  own	  set	  of	  rules.	  Congress	  effectively	  affirms	  Ledbetter’s	  understanding	  of	  a	  paycheck	  accrual	  rule.	  For	  plaintiffs	  like	  Ledbetter,	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  compounding	  discriminatory	  paychecks,	  this	  amendment	  provides	  broader	  and	  more	  robust	  protection	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  Ginsburg’s	  reading	  of	  Title	  VII.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  ignore	  the	  amount	  of	  instruction	  that	  Congress	  took	  from	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  amendment;	  not	  only	  did	  her	  dissent	  directly	  challenge	  Congress	  to	  act,	  but	  it	  also	  provided	  lawmakers	  with	  the	  framework	  they	  needed	  to	  understand	  the	  omissions	  in	  Title	  VII’s	  original	  language.	  The	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  makes	  explicit	  reference	  to	  sex	  discrimination,	  thereby	  eliminating	  any	  ambiguities	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  original	  text	  of	  Title	  VII.	  This	  achievement,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Court	  case	  and	  the	  legislation,	  underscores	  the	  importance	  and	  power	  of	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  .As	  a	  woman	  who	  had	  experienced	  sex	  discrimination	  in	  her	  career,	  Justice	  Ginsburg	  cut	  her	  teeth	  championing	  gender	  rights	  cases	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  In	  her	  article	  Chamallas	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  when	  she	  states,	  	  “Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  name	  is	  synonymous	  with	  gender	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equality.”179	  Her	  dissent	  in	  Ledbetter	  is	  both	  a	  thoughtful	  consideration	  of	  the	  special	  circumstances	  women	  face	  in	  Title	  VII	  cases	  and	  a	  blueprint	  for	  Congress	  to	  remedy	  the	  misinterpretation	  of	  Justice	  Alito	  and	  the	  majority.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Justice	  Ginsburg’s	  dissent	  was	  indeed	  the	  clarion	  call	  to	  action	  that	  set	  Congress	  on	  the	  road	  to	  enacting	  the	  Lilly	  Ledbetter	  Fair	  Pay	  Act	  of	  2009,	  thereby	  advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  gender	  equality	  in	  the	  workplace.	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